Abstract

The courts of the fifty states possess broad authority to safeguard or diminish reproductive autonomy and, as a consequence, the status of health care, reproductive justice, and the well being of women, children, and families in their jurisdictions. Now, more than forty years after Roe vs. Wade and almost fifty years after Griswold v. Connecticut, state courts are as important as at any time since those landmark decisions. In this article, the author surveys the role of state courts in light of increased challenges to both their independence and women’s reproductive rights. Overlapping factors, such as a heightened threat to the availability of legal abortion services, and an increase in efforts to populate state courts with judges opposed to reproductive rights converge to create special urgency for attention to state courts.

The paper first generally describes the role of the state courts relative to the federal courts on these issues. The next section discusses the interactions of state and federal courts in more detail, delving into specific cases to illustrate this concept. Johnsen then details strategies to re-criminalizing abortion by seeking the creation of separate legal rights for fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses in as many contexts as possible, under state and federal law. There are numerous examples that illustrate the diversity of contexts in which state courts may confront the assertion of rights of embryos or fetuses against pregnant (or previously pregnant) women who carried them. Finally, the paper discusses conclusions and recommendations in order to advance reproductive justice for all, implying that the strategies must be multi-pronged to “educate, legislate, and litigate.” Johnsen also concludes with four recommendations for encouraging state courts to play their full independent role in the protection of women’s reproductive rights, which include furthering reforms that seek to de-politicize the state courts.

*I would like to thank my research assistants Kathleen Cullum, Sam von Ende, Besma Fakhri, and Alyson Schwartz for their outstanding assistance in all aspects of the preparation of this essay. I also am deeply grateful to the following individuals for taking the time to provide extensive information and valuable guidance: Bebe Anderson, Jennifer Dalven, Debra Erenberg, Roger Evans, Susan Frietsche, Linda Greenhouse, David Lyle, Louise Melling, Lynn Paltrow, and Melissa Spatz. I also appreciate the financial support of the Piper Fund for the hiring of research assistants. All views expressed and any errors that may appear are solely my own.
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I. Introduction

In the United States constitutional system, the protection of individual rights depends upon the federal and state judiciaries. The role of the federal courts in protecting reproductive rights provides a particularly well known, if controversial, example. *Roe v. Wade* is among the most widely recognized of all judicial decisions.¹ The U.S. Senate, for example, routinely questions Supreme Court nominees about their views on *Roe*, as well as *Roe’s* principal precedent, *Griswold v. Connecticut*.² Although the Supreme Court’s invalidation in *Roe* of Texas’s criminal abortion ban continues to be debated, *Griswold*’s invalidation of a Connecticut law that made it illegal for even married couples to use contraception stands as a pillar of modern constitutionalism.³

The courts of the fifty states also possess broad authority to safeguard or diminish reproductive autonomy and, as a consequence, the status of health care, reproductive justice, and the well-being of women, children, and families in their jurisdictions. State courts interpret the meaning of state laws—constitutional provisions paramount among them—that may provide greater protection for individual rights than the federal Constitution. The movement for marriage equality provides a powerful and related example: the first states to allow couples of the same sex to marry did so only after a state court interpreted a state constitutional guarantee to require what increasingly is recognized as a matter of right.⁴

Americans regularly have battled governmental intrusions on their reproductive rights in state as well as federal courts, dating back to when not only abortion and contraception were illegal, but so, too, was the distribution of information about how to prevent unintended pregnancy.⁵ Now, more than forty years after *Roe* and fifty years after *Griswold*, state courts are as important as at any time since those landmark decisions. Overlapping factors converge to create special urgency for attention to state courts. A brief review of five such factors helps situate this essay’s analysis of the contemporary relevance of state courts to the fight for reproductive justice.

³ See supra note 2; Morton J. Horowitz, *The Meaning of the Bork Nomination in American Constitutional History*, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 655 (1989) (explaining the significant role played by Robert Bork’s opposition to *Griswold* in the Senate’s failure to confirm him to the U.S. Supreme Court). But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2775 (2014) (holding that certain for-profit employers have a right to deny health care coverage to employees based on the employer’s religious opposition to contraception).
First, this is a time of heightened threat to the availability of legal abortion services, which diminishes the effectiveness and availability of women’s health care services more generally. Several facts illustrate this trend:

- State legislatures enacted more abortion restrictions in the last three years (2011–2013) than in the previous decade.7
- Between 2000 and 2013, the proportion of women living in states hostile to abortion rights nearly doubled, from 31% to 56% (as measured by the Guttmacher Institute).8
- The number of abortion providers in the United States has fallen over 40% since 19829 and has declined 4% between 2008 and 2011 alone; 89% of all U.S. counties lack an abortion clinic.10
- The number of providers will continue to fall from 2011 levels unless courts enjoin new restrictions, as illustrated by the situation in Texas where in 2014 the number of clinics shrunk from forty-one to nineteen and threatened to fall to seven.11
- In six states, only a single clinic remains open in the entire state,12 placing them at special risk of soon becoming, as abortion opponents describe their aspiration, “abortion free.”13

Second, women increasingly depend upon state courts not only to protect their rights to terminate pregnancies but also to safeguard their liberty, equality, and dignity during pregnancy. The assault on reproductive rights seeks broadly to define

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6 The unintended pregnancy rate in the United States is extraordinarily high—half of all pregnancies—about forty percent of which end in abortion. Guttmacher Inst., Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States Fact Sheet (2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf [http://perma.cc/7QXZ-HVAM] [hereinafter Guttmacher Inst., Induced Abortion]. The same clinics that perform abortions typically provide a range of reproductive and sexual health care, including pregnancy prevention services; for more than six out of ten clients (and more than seven out of ten with incomes below the poverty line), the family planning clinic is their “usual” source of health care. Rachel Benson Gold et al., Guttmacher Inst., Next Steps for America’s Family Planning Program: Leveraging the Potential of Medicaid and Title X in an Evolving Health Care System 14, 16 (2009), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/NextSteps.pdf [http://perma.cc/BCE4-8MCD].


8 Nash et al., supra note 7.


10 Guttmacher Inst., Induced Abortion, supra note 6.


fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses as persons possessing rights independent of pregnant women. National Advocates for Pregnant Women has documented hundreds of instances since Roe in which states have used criminal and civil law in efforts to specially punish or control women because they had an abortion, experienced a miscarriage or stillbirth, or engaged in behavior a prosecutor or physician deemed harmful to embryonic or fetal development. Women have been subjected to arrest, criminal prosecution, incarceration, civil commitment, and forced medical treatment. Broad definitions of personhood that encompass fertilized eggs also threaten women’s access to the most effective and personally appropriate methods of contraception. Because these misguided efforts are actually detrimental to healthy pregnancies, leading medical associations have joined in opposition to what the New York Times recently condemned as “criminalizing expectant mothers.”

Third, in the years since Griswold and Roe, the federal courts have become far less hospitable to the protection of reproductive rights. Ultimately, rights related to pregnancy should be protected at the federal level and not vary state-by-state. However, a long-term partisan effort to overrule Roe has rendered the federal courts more likely to uphold governmental restrictions and intrusions. Forty years ago abortion was not a partisan issue: Roe’s seven-Justice majority included five Republican-appointed Justices. But beginning in 1980, the Republican Party platform has stated: “We will work for the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life.” As of 2014, Republican presidents have appointed twelve of the last sixteen Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court. The present Roberts Court is sharply divided, with the five Republican appointees supportive of abortion restrictions that the Court previously held unconstitutional.

Fourth, coinciding with the increased need for state court protection, opponents of Roe have ramped up efforts to populate state courts with like-minded judges. These efforts

14 See infra Part IV.
16 See infra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
are supported by the launching of the Republican State Leadership Committee’s state-focused “judicial fairness initiative”\textsuperscript{22} and take two principal forms.\textsuperscript{23} As at the federal level, some state Republican Party platforms expressly call for the selection of judges who oppose \textit{Roe}, and state anti-abortion organizations regularly target particular judges and nominees. This tactic became well known in the related issue of marriage equality when self-described “pro-family” organizations targeted for electoral defeat state court judges who had held that prohibitions on the ability of same-sex couples to marry violated state constitutional protections.\textsuperscript{24} An emerging, second form of activism opposes entire systems of judicial selection viewed as interfering with the ability to select judges based on prospective judges’ opposition to reproductive rights. In the last few years, anti-abortion organizations in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Tennessee have opposed judicial selection systems premised on consideration of judicial candidates’ merit, in favor of systems of direct elections in which they can “hold accountable” “elitist” judges who protect reproductive rights. This move against merit selection has profound implications for the full range of issues that come before state courts: the rights of criminal defendants, the indigent, persons of color, and corporations, to name a few of the most affected. Making judges stand for election exposes them to mounting general threats to elections and democracy—encouraged by recent decisions of a U.S. Supreme Court closely divided on the same partisan lines as in the abortion decisions.\textsuperscript{25} Unprecedented levels of money in politics and new barriers to voting will disproportionately disadvantage and disenfranchise those who lack the resources and practical ability to take equal, effective part in American politics. These are the same individuals who tend to be especially harmed by abortion and pregnancy-related restrictions and most in need of judicial protection.

A fifth factor contributing to the urgent need for state court independence is public opinion. Although a majority of Americans support \textit{Roe} and oppose criminal abortion bans,\textsuperscript{26} many current forms of abortion restrictions were specially designed to attract majority support by disguising their true nature and purporting to protect women’s health.\textsuperscript{27} Moreover, the harms and indignities of abortion restrictions, today and pre-\textit{Roe}, fall disproportionately on women who lack the resources to overcome them: poor women, young women, women of color, immigrant women, and women who reside in rural areas or in the middle of the country or the South, in “red” or “purple” states with ideologically conservative politics.\textsuperscript{28} To protect and realize reproductive justice, all persons—regardless of personal identity, race, economic status, or geography—must


\textsuperscript{23} See infra Part V.


\textsuperscript{25} See infra note 203.

\textsuperscript{26} A recent Gallup poll found that, “[f]orty years after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in \textit{Roe v. Wade}, significantly more Americans want the landmark abortion decision kept in place rather than overturned.” Lydia Saad, \textit{Majority of Americans Still Support Roe v. Wade Decision}, \textsc{Gallup} (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160058/majority-americans-support-roeh-wade-decision.aspx [http://perma.cc/3VJL-9JJJ].

\textsuperscript{27} See infra Part III(C).

\textsuperscript{28} See infra notes 60–62, 87–92.
be able to access and freely choose reproductive healthcare, which in turn depends, in part, upon the judiciary. Judges, of course, are obligated to protect rights regardless of local political sentiment. At the same time, judges — especially elected judges, dependent on votes, endorsements, and campaign contributions — typically do not stray far from public opinion.

Two examples help show how these five factors converge. The connections between money in politics and reproductive rights can be seen in the enterprise of Indiana lawyer James Bopp. Bopp is a principal architect of current efforts to use the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to invalidate regulations imposed on campaign contributions and increase the amount of money in politics — including in the selection of state judges. Not entirely coincidentally, “the man behind Citizens United” has also, for thirty-six years, served as general counsel to the National Right to Life Committee and has helped craft a strategy to gut Roe. Bopp believes Roe should be overruled but recognizes that an express overruling is unrealistic at this time. He instead endorses making abortion unavailable, state-by-state, through cumulative restrictions that shut down clinics and otherwise make abortion services more stigmatized, expensive, and scarce. He also is active in Republican Party politics, including the drafting of national and Indiana Republican Party platforms.

The current situation in Tennessee further illustrates the vital and complex nature of state court involvement in the law and politics of reproductive rights. In 2000,

29 Public interest lawyers at the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Reproductive Rights, and Planned Parenthood Federation of America assess the prospects of state and federal challenges to scores of new state restrictions enacted each year and handle most of this litigation. Many other organizations join them in advancing reproductive justice in courts, legislatures, and all aspects of society. Vital among them are state-based organizations — such as the Women’s Law Project of Pennsylvania and the state affiliates of NARAL Pro-Choice America — and many that work to keep the focus on the full range of issues and perspectives of reproductive justice, including National Advocates for Pregnant Women and those that comprise SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective. For an overview of a reproductive justice movement led by women of color, see generally Jael Silliman, Loretta Ross & Elena Gutierrez, Undivided Rights: Women of Color Organize for Reproductive Justice (2004); Asian Communities for Reproductive Justice, A New Vision for Advancing our Movement for Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights, and Reproductive Justice (2005), http://forwardtogether.org/assets/docs/ACRJ-A-New-Vision.pdf [http://perma.cc/5HZC-7TPE].


32 Mencimer, supra note 31.


the Tennessee Supreme Court interpreted the Tennessee Constitution as protecting reproductive autonomy more fully than the federal Constitution. The court relied upon “the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation,” a right it first recognized in resolving a dispute about the disposition of a pre-embryo created in the process of in vitro fertilization—a seminal ruling in the field of assisted reproductive technology. Anti-abortion forces retaliated on multiple fronts. Most directly, in November 2014, Tennessee voters approved a ballot measure that restricts Tennessee courts’ ability to protect reproductive rights by amending the Tennessee Constitution to provide: “Nothing in this Constitution secures or protects a right to abortion.” Further, in an August 2014 retention election, Tennessee Right to Life, the state’s largest anti-abortion organization, joined forces with the Koch-brothers-backed Americans for Prosperity to target three Tennessee Supreme Court justices. Although the justices prevailed, the margin of victory was sufficiently narrow that a New York Times headline reported, “Despite Failure, Campaign to Oust Tennessee Justices Keeps Conservatives Hopeful.” In addition, the state has been engaged for years in complicated debates about the state’s system of judicial selection, leading in 2013 to a failure to extend the life of the Judicial Nominating Commission and in November 2014 to the approval, in addition to “the Abortion Amendment,” of a ballot measure regarding the selection of appellate judges. Finally, in July of 2014, Tennessee became the first state to pass a statute applying the crime of fetal assault to pregnant women regarding their own pregnancies, and a week after the law went into effect, a woman was arrested for allegedly violating it.

This essay analyzes the role of state courts in light of the increased challenges at the outset of 2015 to both judicial independence and women’s reproductive rights. Following this Introduction, Part II provides background on the state and federal judiciaries in our

35 Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn., Inc. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that the Tennessee Constitution provides a guaranteed right of privacy and that “a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy is a vital part of the right to privacy . . . inherent in the concept of ordered liberty embodied in the Tennessee Constitution . . . ”).

36 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (reasoning that courts should respect the wishes of persons who donate eggs or sperm).


constitutional system. Part III examines the role of state courts relative to federal courts over the last half century in protecting against restrictions on contraception and abortion. Part IV considers a range of other pregnancy-related restrictions and intrusions handled in state courts. Part V concludes with recommendations for encouraging state courts to fulfill their responsibility to protect reproductive rights for all within their jurisdictions, in the face of efforts to politicize state judicial selection to promote outcomes to the contrary.

II. Role of State Courts in “Our Federalism”

The U.S. Constitution establishes a system of government in which the national and fifty state governments share authority. Although the precise nature of “our federalism” can be complicated and controversial in some contexts, the essential structure as it relates to the protection of reproductive rights is straightforward. Actions of state legislatures, executive officers, and other state actors are subject to judicial constraint, review, and interpretation by courts at the state and federal levels, applying state as well as federal law. Federal law is supreme, so states may not, for example, restrict the provision of abortion services in ways that conflict with rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Subject to this “federal floor of protection,” states may define and protect rights differently than federal guarantees, as state courts have in numerous cases affecting reproductive rights.

Most fundamentally, each state is governed by its own constitution, which controls and constrains state action. Thus, individual rights and liberties are potentially doubly protected by state and federal constitutions, the provisions of which sometimes differ in significant respects, either textually or by interpretation. Indeed, prior to the Civil War and the fundamental changes effected by the Reconstruction Amendments, Americans often had only the state courts to turn to for even the most basic rights. State courts continue to decide the vast majority of cases: about 30,000 state court judges handle roughly thirty million cases, compared to 1,600 federal judges with just over one million cases. In addition to protecting their own citizens, state court decisions may serve as a model for other states or for the federal courts. Justice William Brennan put it well in a 1977 seminal essay on state court independence: “[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”

In practice, state courts often simply follow the federal courts’ lead and interpret their constitutional protections to be coextensive with identical or analogous...
federal protections. U.S. history, however, is replete with examples of state courts interpreting their own constitutions differently, including to afford greater protection even in the absence of textual differences. One example that Justice Brennan likely had in mind when he urged state courts to act independently was a 1973 case in which he dissented from a five-Justice majority opinion that rejected a constitutional challenge to Texas’s grossly unequal system for funding public education.\footnote{San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).} Years later, on this issue of tremendous importance, the Texas Supreme Court unanimously rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach and held that the system violated the Texas Constitution.\footnote{Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).}

The cause of marriage equality provides an especially instructive and inspiring example. As in the case of women’s reproductive rights, advances in securing the right of gays and lesbians to marry has depended on both state and federal court rulings, premised on the same textual and conceptual bases: liberty, privacy, and equality.\footnote{See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (denying same-sex couples the ability to marry violates state constitutional guarantee of equal protection); Kerrigan v. Comm’n of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (denying same-sex couples the ability to marry violates state constitutional guarantee of equal protection); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (denying same-sex couples the ability to marry violates state constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equality).} Moreover, the precise content of fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution in both contexts may depend in part on our nation’s “history and tradition” measured by state treatment of the issue. \textit{Lawrence v. Texas}, for example, discussed the evolving nature of state criminalization of same-sex sodomy.\footnote{Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568–75 (2003).} Marriage equality advocates have prioritized efforts in state courts. In the words of Freedom to Marry’s President Evan Wolfson, they have tried to “win more states” and ultimately persuade the Supreme Court to end marriage discrimination: “Using the struggle against race discrimination in marriage as a measure, [we are] still far short of the 34 states that had ended race-based marriage discrimination when the Supreme Court ruled in \textit{Loving v. Virginia} (1967).”\footnote{Freedom To Marry, \textit{Annual Report 2010}, at 3 (2010), http://freemarry3cdn.net/953d3c4f6119cb42b_qum62vjd.pdf [http://perma.cc/M56B-4JFQ].}

The differences, as much as the similarities, between marriage equality and reproductive rights help explain the potential of state courts. Although state courts always remain free to interpret their constitutions to provide independent and stronger protections, timing matters. State courts may rule in advance of the U.S. Supreme Court, as in the case of marriage equality (state and lower federal courts considered the issue contemporaneously), or afterwards, as when the Texas Supreme Court rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to the inequality in public education funding.\footnote{Compare Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 777 S.W.2d 391 (holding the Texas school financing system violated the state constitution), with \textit{San Antonio}, 411 U.S. 1 (upholding the Texas school financing system against a federal constitutional challenge).} An absence of federal precedent requires state courts to exercise greater independence and affords them greater potential to inform federal courts interpreting the U.S. Constitution, as well as other states considering their own constitutions. As the next Part discusses, state rulings on restrictive abortion laws usually have followed U.S. Supreme Court rulings. A close examination reveals a relatively complex history of interaction—and the story continues.
III. State and Federal Constitutional Rulings on Contraception and Abortion Restrictions

The U.S. Constitution, properly interpreted, affords strong protection against governmental efforts to interfere with highly personal and consequential decisions about childbearing. The U.S. Supreme Court primarily relies upon the constitutional protections of “liberty” in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, sometimes (though with decreasing frequency) describing the right as one of privacy.52 State constitutions provide protections under provisions that sometimes mirror the federal Constitution, but in some cases provide stronger textual support. Some state constitutions contain express guarantees of privacy,53 and others protect liberty in stronger language than the federal Constitution.54 The Court also has relied upon the federal guarantee of “equal protection” to protect reproductive rights,55 and many commentators have advocated that this guarantee more generally should protect against abortion restrictions under a theory of gender discrimination.56 In holding restrictions on abortion funding unconstitutional, some state courts have relied upon textually similar guarantees of equal protection, while others have relied upon textually different provisions, including a right to common benefit,57 a guarantee of privileges and immunities,58 and an equal rights amendment similar to the one ultimately not ratified at the federal level.59

Although the ability to decide when and whether to bear children should not depend upon one's state of residence, the reality is that state law and politics have created dramatic differences that are likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Since before Roe and continuing today, women who live in the Northeast and on the West Coast suffer fewer government intrusions and enjoy greater reproductive autonomy and support than women who live in the South or in the middle of the country (though shortcomings in reproductive justice, particularly for the least powerful, exist in all parts of the country).60 The degree of state-based disparities has varied over time, depending largely on the extent of gaps in federal protection and the local availability

of abortion services (which, in part, reflects the prevalence of clinic harassment and violence). The inequalities were most severe before Roe, substantially improved between 1973 and 1986, and worsened again after the Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.64 Always, the resulting harms of those inequalities fall most intensely on those women who are unable to travel, due to financial or other obstacles, to a state where they can obtain abortion services.62

Disparities among states also have depended upon their willingness to fill gaps in federal protection, either by judicial interpretation or legislation. One of the most comprehensive of the many analyses of state constitutional protection of reproductive rights, Paul Benjamin Linton’s book, Abortion Under State Constitutions: A State-by-State Analysis, devotes a separate chapter to each state to assess all potentially relevant constitutional provisions and judicial decisions.63 Linton personally opposes Roe, and he concludes each chapter with two assessments of that state’s law: (1) whether, “[i]f Roe, as modified by Casey, is ultimately overruled,” the state “could enact and enforce a statute prohibiting abortion”64 (or enforce a pre-Roe statute — still on the books — that prohibits abortion);65 and (2) whether anything in the state’s constitution precludes that state from “regulating abortion within federal constitutional limits in the meantime.”66 At the time of his 2008 book, Linton found that twelve states’ supreme courts “have recognized a state constitutional right to abortion” that would independently constrain the state,67 and that the highest courts of thirty-eight states “have not yet decided whether there is a state constitutional right to abortion.”68 However, the presence of a state constitutional guarantee that would remain in effect were the Supreme Court to overrule Roe does not necessarily render that guarantee more extensive than the current federal guarantee; Linton found that ten state supreme courts have interpreted state constitutions to be coextensive with federal guarantees.69 In a January 2014 analysis examining a related question, NARAL Pro-Choice America found that sixteen states have interpreted their constitutions as providing more expansive protection for abortion rights than the U.S. Supreme Court has held is afforded by the federal Constitution.70

64 Linton, supra note 63, at 68.
65 Id. at 44.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 605.
68 Id. at 609.
69 Id.
70 NARAL Pro-Choice Am., supra note 7, at 28. Since then, however, a ballot measure amended the Tennessee Constitution to limit its protection of reproductive rights. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
A. The Road to Roe v. Wade (1973)

It was only beginning in the 1960s and 1970s—with advances in prevailing societal attitudes about sexuality, reproduction, and gender equality—that any realistic possibility existed that judges would equally and fairly apply to women’s reproductive rights the federal and state constitutional protections of liberty, privacy, equal protection, and privileges and immunities. An earlier foundational case, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, protected against governmental intrusion into individuals’ childbearing decisions. In what can be viewed as an early version of today’s “three strikes and you’re out” laws that impose life sentences on three-time offenders, an Oklahoma statute imposed forcible sterilization as a penalty after the third conviction for some, but not all, felonies (differences that, not surprisingly, tracked class and political power). In holding the law unconstitutional, the Court said: “We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”

The Supreme Court’s 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut invalidated a Connecticut law that made it illegal for even a married couple to use contraception. In keeping with the times, the Justices, in oral argument and in their opinions, emphasized that the case involved the “private,” “fundamental,” and “intimate to the degree of being sacred” marital relationship, while avoiding the fact that it also involved women’s ability to engage in sexual intercourse while avoiding pregnancy. In 1972, the Court held unconstitutional a Massachusetts law that banned the sale of contraceptives for unmarried individuals, explaining, “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to whether to bear or beget a child.” In 1973, the Court in Roe v. Wade cited Skinner, Griswold, and Eisenstadt v. Baird, and a right to privacy grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection of liberty, in striking down a Texas law that deemed the performance of an abortion at any stage of pregnancy a felony, with an exception only to save the life of the woman.

Roe dramatically diminished the extent to which a woman’s ability to prevent and control the timing of childbearing varied by state of residence or ability...
to pay for interstate or even international travel. For women without the resources to travel, it also largely ended the need to resort to dangerous illegal abortions, notwithstanding later limiting opinions that exacerbated inequality, particularly by denying public funding for abortions under Medicaid.

The fact that Griswold and Roe came early in shifts in popular understandings about what had been viewed as women’s “natural” and “destined” role as mothers meant that state court litigation was relatively sparse in these early years and did not play the same foundational role, for example, as in the movement for marriage equality. By one count, in the years before Roe, state courts in fifteen states considered state and/or federal constitutional challenges to state abortion restrictions, mainly in the eight years between Griswold and Roe. Most rejected the challenges, but the highest courts in California (1969) and Florida (1972) held their pre-Roe criminal abortion bans inconsistent with state constitutional protections.


For most of the two decades after Roe and before Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992, reproductive rights litigation was concentrated in the federal courts, under federal constitutional standards. Courts applied Roe’s appropriately demanding “strict scrutiny” standard of review to invalidate most harmful state abortion restrictions, such as husband notification and waiting period requirements. Two important exceptions illustrate the potential and limitations of state courts.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld two types of abortion restrictions, both of which disproportionately harmed vulnerable women without political clout, resulting in extensive state court litigation aimed at filling those gaps in vital abortion access. In one series of decisions, the Court upheld federal and state legislation that excluded abortion services from the health care provided to poor women under Medicaid and, later, that prohibited public facilities and public employees from providing abortion services. At the heart of these decisions was the federal Hyde Amendment,

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80 Id.
81 Cates, Jr. et al., supra note 62, at 25.
82 See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
83 Linton, supra note 63, at 4 n.9.
84 People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969) (finding California’s ban on abortion inconsistent with the California Constitution’s protections of liberty and privacy); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1972) (finding Florida’s ban on abortion inconsistent with both the state’s constitutional guarantee of due process and the federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment).
named for Congressman Henry Hyde, which has prevented federal funding for abortions since 1977, in only slightly varying forms. Four Justices would have found the exclusion of funding unconstitutional, including Justice Marshall who wrote in dissent that the express purpose and function of the amendment was to "deprive poor and minority women of the constitutional right to choose abortion."89

The Supreme Court's decisions left states free to pay for abortions in circumstances identical to those in which the Hyde Amendment barred the use of federal funds.90 Reproductive rights advocates therefore challenged funding restrictions under state constitutions where they believed the state courts might reach a more favorable result. Currently, seventeen states fund all or most medically necessary abortions through state programs, thirteen of which are pursuant to a judicial determination that the state constitution provides stronger protection than the federal Constitution.91 Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia exclude abortion services from the health care coverage provided to poor women.92

In a second series of decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court held that states may require minors to notify or obtain the consent of their parents before having an abortion, as long as the state provides a "bypass" alternative by which a minor may seek a judicial determination that she is sufficiently mature to make her own decision or that an abortion without compelled parental involvement is otherwise in her interests.93 State supreme courts in Alaska, California, Florida, New Jersey, and Washington each have found that their state constitutions confer greater protection for minors' reproductive rights than that provided under federal doctrine.94 In Florida, however, after the Florida Supreme Court invoked a strict scrutiny analysis to find a requirement of parental consent unconstitutional, that decision was overturned by constitutional amendment.95 The composition of state courts

89 Zbaraz, 448 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 See, e.g., id. at 358.
95 Fla. Const. art. X, § 22.
also affects whether they actually give minors, as the U.S. Constitution requires, the opportunity to “bypass” parental involvement when it is not in their interests. Some judges routinely deny such requests, to the point that in some jurisdictions minors simply no longer seek them and in effect are denied a bypass option.96

In some states, courts found greater protection against funding or minors’ restrictions even though the state constitution was textually indistinguishable from the federal Constitution, while other state courts emphasized textual differences. For example, the Supreme Court of California cited the California Constitution’s express guarantee of a right to privacy in invalidating both a public funding restriction and a parental consent requirement.97 Interestingly, that privacy provision was added after the California Supreme Court held, in 1969, that a pre-Roe state abortion ban violated an implied constitutional right to privacy protected by both the U.S. and California constitutions.98 To take an example where the text differed, state courts in Connecticut and New Mexico relied in part on their state constitutions’ equal rights amendment to invalidate a public funding restriction.99 In another, the Alaska Supreme Court struck down a parental consent requirement, relying on the Alaska Constitution’s privacy amendment and stating that the textual right to privacy is “more robust and ‘broader in scope’ than those of the implied federal right to privacy.”100 Other state courts, including those in Oregon and Indiana, cited textual differences in the state constitutions’ privileges and immunities clauses to extend public funding for abortion beyond federal requirements;101 in the case of the “red” state of Indiana, however, the court’s holding only required funding where pregnancy threatened “serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.”102

This history reveals that a state court’s willingness to invalidate harmful abortion restrictions may depend at least as much on the court’s composition as on the text of the constitution. Unlike Connecticut and New Mexico, for

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96 See, e.g., Caroline A. Placey, Note, Of Judicial Bypass Procedures, Moral Recusal, and Protected Political Speech, Throwing Pregnant Minors Under the Campaign Bus, 56 Emory L.J. 693, 706–11 (2006) (citing Mark Rolenhagen, Clinics Fight Notification Rule by Filing Suit, Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), June 18, 1992, at 1C (reporting that denial of waiver applications varied by county in Ohio, ranging from two percent to one hundred percent)).

97 Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981) (citing Cal. Const. art. I, § 1). In rejecting the California Attorney General’s argument that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. McRae should be decisive in assessing the constitutionality of the state law, the California Supreme Court declared, “[S]tate courts are ‘independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of their citizens.’” Id. at 783. Later, the California Supreme Court held that the state’s mandatory parental involvement law violated a minor’s state constitutional right of privacy and “even when the terms of the California Constitution are textually identical to those of the federal Constitution, the proper interpretation of the state constitutional provision is not invariably identical to the federal courts’ interpretation of the corresponding provision contained in the federal Constitution.” Lungren, 940 P.2d at 808.


102 Humphreys, 796 N.E.2d at 259.
example, Pennsylvania and Texas ruled against challenges to discriminatory funding laws even though the Pennsylvania Constitution contained an equal rights amendment protecting against sex discrimination, and the Texas Supreme Court had interpreted its constitution to protect women from sex discrimination under a higher standard than the federal Constitution affords. The vast majority of state courts have not provided additional protection—and probably will not, absent changes in the courts’ composition or popular understandings of constitutional meaning.

At the federal level, the Supreme Court’s changing composition explains much. That change has not been coincidental. President Reagan’s administration and the Republican Party prioritized remaking the federal courts to overrule Roe. Notably, Justice Brennan wrote the words quoted above in support of independence in state constitutional interpretation in 1977, when changes in the Court’s composition threatened to undermine a variety of constitutional rights. Justice Brennan repeated this message in 1986, a time when Republican presidents had appointed seven consecutive Supreme Court Justices.

By the late 1980s the changing Supreme Court seemed to virtually all observers to have achieved the Republican Party’s official goal of a majority of Justices who believed Roe was wrongly decided. The Court’s 1989 decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services is little known today, but at the time attracted tremendous attention and raised public awareness that, with Roe and the federal courts in question, state courts and elected officials at all levels of government were newly important to protecting reproductive rights. Because no one had a clear sense of what returning the issue to the states actually would mean, NARAL undertook the first comprehensive state-by-state survey of the status of abortion rights. The results were grim, with predictions of widespread criminal bans and other harsh restrictions if the Court were to overrule Roe.

C. Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) to Present: The Undue Burden Standard

The existential threat to Roe abated in 1992, with the Supreme Court’s Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision rejecting the first Bush administration’s
request that it expressly overrule Roe. Later that year, President Clinton's election offered additional reassurance. The public perception of the threat plummeted, indeed beyond what the Casey decision merited. Advocates and reproductive health care providers have remained cognizant of the vital role of state courts and state legislatures, but until recently, not so the general public. Casey's declaration that it reaffirmed what it characterized as the core of Roe proved to be a placating game-changer that restored public confidence in the federal courts as protectors of reproductive rights.

Events of the last several years, however, have brought a growing manifestation and appreciation of the dangers of the flipside of Casey: its adoption of a newly created, less protective, and malleable "undue burden" standard. Increasingly, this standard is encouraging harmful state restrictions on abortion. Casey itself held constitutional a mandatory waiting period, directly contrary to an earlier ruling, and overruled two earlier Supreme Court decisions from 1983 and 1986.

One critical marker was the Supreme Court's own use of the "undue burden" standard in 2007 in Gonzales v. Carhart to uphold the so-called federal "partial birth abortion ban" in a five-four decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the clear deciding vote after Justice Samuel Alito replaced Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Gonzales all but overruled another five-four decision, Stenberg v. Carhart, in which Justice Kennedy had dissented and Justice O'Connor was a necessary vote to invalidate a similar state statute. Notably, Justice Kennedy has never found an abortion restriction unconstitutional since his surprising decision in Casey to provide a critical vote to uphold Roe's "core.”

Since Gonzales, states have enacted abortion restrictions in record numbers. Some take the form of clearly unconstitutional pre-viability abortion bans. Just since 2013, states have enacted laws that ban abortion at six weeks, twelve weeks, and twenty weeks. North Dakota, with only one clinic that provides abortions in the entire state, enacted laws

112 Id.
113 Id. at 873.
117 Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
118 See id. at 871 ("The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.").
separately banning abortion at six weeks and twenty weeks in an effort to cover its bases in the event a court strikes down the six-week ban.\textsuperscript{120}

More often, restrictions take the form of what is commonly described as TRAP laws, or “targeted regulation of abortion providers.”\textsuperscript{121} Under the guise of helping women by regulating abortion providers, these laws actually force providers of abortion services to close down, for example through innocuous-sounding, but expensive and difficult-to-meet requirements that dictate the physical structure of clinics and effectively require the construction of small hospitals.\textsuperscript{122} The restrictions are cumulative and reinforcing in their harm. One type of TRAP prominent in 2014 would prohibit clinics from operating unless the physician performing the abortion acquires “admitting privileges” at a nearby hospital.\textsuperscript{123} A variation requires the clinic to convince a hospital to enter into a “transfer” agreement to treat their patient. Admitting privilege and transfer requirements are not medically indicated or in any way beneficial, as hospitals are already legally required to admit women in the extremely rare circumstances of an emergency following an abortion.\textsuperscript{124} They also typically are difficult or impossible to obtain for a variety of reasons, including hospital rules that physicians work within a certain proximity or admit a minimum number of patients to the hospital.\textsuperscript{125} Even if a physician meets the requirements, the hospital need not grant the privileges. Laws requiring admitting privileges leave abortion providers susceptible to denials based solely on religion or ideology, as many hospitals are affiliated with the Catholic Church or otherwise opposed to abortion—or simply want to avoid potential controversy.\textsuperscript{126}

For each new restriction enacted, reproductive rights litigators assess the prospects of a challenge in state or federal court. In most states, the state courts as they exist at the close of 2014 do not promise any more protection than the federal courts. The several federal courts to consider admitting privileges restrictions have split in their conclusions, with a split even between panels of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. One panel found a Texas admitting privileges requirement constitutional and allowed it to go into effect, resulting in more than half the clinics closing (forty-one clinics..."
reduced to nineteen clinics).\textsuperscript{126} A different, divided Fifth Circuit panel upheld a preliminary injunction blocking a Mississippi admitting privileges requirement from going into effect, which would have forced the only remaining clinic in the state to close.\textsuperscript{127} The parties have petitioned the full Fifth Circuit to rehear both cases en banc. On August 29, 2014, a federal district court permanently enjoined another TRAP provision in Texas, which required that all abortion clinics meet the standards applied to ambulatory surgical centers, on the grounds it imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion;\textsuperscript{128} if not sustained on appeal, the law would force all but seven or eight of the remaining Texas clinics to close.\textsuperscript{129}

In Ohio, reproductive health advocates went to state court to challenge an onerous transfer agreement requirement. Ohio law first required transfer agreements with local hospitals,\textsuperscript{130} and clinics worked hard to secure them with public hospitals. The legislature then amended the law to prohibit public hospitals from entering into such agreements.\textsuperscript{131} Due to these and other restrictions, of the fourteen clinics open at the outset of 2013, five have closed and others are expected to follow,\textsuperscript{132} which would leave major cities and heavily populated areas with no clinics.\textsuperscript{133}

Since the Court’s \textit{Casey} decision, reproductive rights advocates have achieved mixed results in state courts. Outside the earlier standard context of funding and parental notice restrictions, which continue on occasion, successes have been few and far between and can be briefly described. In a strong 1999 opinion, the Montana Supreme Court held that a state law requiring that abortions be performed solely by licensed physicians violated the state constitution’s privacy protection, which, the court held, “affords significantly broader protection than does the federal Constitution.”\textsuperscript{134} The next year, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued a ruling strongly protective of reproductive rights, holding that the Tennessee Constitution provided

\textit{Quackery & Abortion Rights, supra note 11.}


\textit{Ohio Admin. Code § 3701-83-19(E).}


\textit{Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 375 (Mont. 1999).}
an independent right to privacy and greater protections than the federal Constitution. The court declined to adopt Casey's undue burden standard and instead analyzed the challenged provisions under a strict scrutiny standard, resulting in the invalidation of requirements that abortions performed after the first trimester be performed in a hospital and that women delay their abortions at least two days after receiving state-mandated information. However, a new amendment to the Tennessee Constitution passed by ballot measure in November 2014 may essentially overrule this decision by amending the Tennessee Constitution to state: “Nothing in this Constitution secures or protects a right to abortion.”

Currently, state court challenges to abortion restrictions are pending in eleven states. Although litigation within the fifty state systems changes quickly, this snapshot at the close of 2014 reveals creativity and practical limitations in both the restrictions and the challenges and suggests tenacity on the part of advocates on both sides. Two of the challenges do not claim a violation of individual reproductive rights protected under a state constitution. A challenge to the Ohio transfer agreement requirement (as well as other restrictions in the law) rests on a claim that it was enacted in violation of the Ohio Constitution's requirement that legislation be limited to a single subject. A Texas suit argues that regulations that disqualify abortion providers from receiving state Medicaid funds were improperly promulgated, without statutory authority. Challenges in two states involve mandatory parental involvement. These challenges, pending in Montana and Alaska, are the current iterations of ongoing litigation surrounding parental involvement laws. A challenge to Montana's parental notification law (enacted by a 2012 referendum) and parental consent law (enacted by a 2013 legislative act) is currently pending before the Montana Supreme Court, after a district court found a nearly identical law unconstitutional in 1999. Plaintiffs in this case argue that the onerous parental consent and notification laws violate minors’ rights to privacy, equal protection, and due process guaranteed by the state constitution. The challenge to Alaska's parental notification law, which was enacted by referendum, also followed a state court ruling striking

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135 Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn., Inc. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000).
136 Id.
141 Id.
down a similar law. Similarly, Alaska’s public funding regulation and statute would limit the availability of public funding for abortions in violation of a 2001 Alaska Supreme Court ruling that the state’s Medicaid system may not discriminate in the type of care it provides. The Superior Court of Alaska has issued a preliminary injunction against this funding regulation.

Of the remaining challenges in seven states, four involve laws that restrict medication abortions. A North Dakota trial court judge issued a strong opinion in support of a permanent injunction blocking a law that essentially bans all medication abortions. In Iowa and Wisconsin, the legislature prohibited physicians from prescribing medication to induce abortions after electronic (rather than in-person) consultation. A state challenge to an Arizona medication abortion restriction has been stayed pending a parallel federal challenge. State court challenges are pending against Kansas and Virginia TRAP laws that impose onerous and expensive licensing requirements for abortion clinics. Finally, a Georgia trial court temporarily enjoined a law that banned doctors from performing abortions twenty weeks after fertilization.

Absent some significant change, advocates cannot hope to make widespread progress in the state courts and must continue to worry about the serious risk of bringing a case that will create bad law. The change necessary includes improved public and judicial understanding of the harms of TRAP laws and other restrictions and the value of reproductive control to women and families. Any increase in state protection for women could inform rulings in other states, as well as ultimately in the U.S. Supreme Court.

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At least two conceptual issues could benefit from additional attention from state courts, and in the meantime, from advocates and academics. First, what is the appropriate standard of judicial review? Although the U.S. Supreme Court currently uses the Casey “undue burden” standard, from Roe in 1973 through Webster in 1989 it used the more appropriate, traditional “strict scrutiny” standard that federal courts generally use to protect fundamental rights. State courts are entirely free to continue to apply the more protective strict scrutiny standard under their own constitutions, but they rarely do. State courts should be encouraged to adhere to the initial and more protective standard, especially given this rare event where the U.S. Supreme Court has lowered the standard of protection for a right previously regarded as fundamental.

Equally important as which standard state courts adopt is how they apply the standard. State courts could evaluate “undue burdens” with care and understanding and thereby ultimately guide the U.S. Supreme Court to protect reproductive rights with due regard for the practical, cumulative effects of restrictions designed to appear innocuous or even beneficial to women, but with the actual purpose and effect of making abortion services unavailable. Thus far, the lower federal courts have split on how to apply the undue burden standard. State courts should follow the lead of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, which recently applied the undue burden standard to strike down an admitting privileges requirement, considering “whether, examining the regulation in its real-world context, the obstacle is more significant than is warranted by the State’s justifications for the regulation.”

In reaching its conclusion, the court considered the following circumstances: a history of severe anti-abortion violence and destruction, including the murder of Dr. David Gunn; a decrease in the number of providers from twelve in 2001 to five in 2014; a nationwide scarcity of physicians who perform abortions; and the economic and psychological burdens on women, which would fall more harshly on certain identifiable groups of women. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit similarly considered the relevance of other factors, including medical need, to the “undue burden” assessment, “The feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the burden, even slight, to be ‘undue’ in the sense of disproportionate or gratuitous.”

In addition to the appropriate standard of review, state courts could develop additional conceptual bases for protecting reproductive rights, in particular by recognizing reproductive autonomy as vital to women’s equality. In 1973, the Roe Court could not realistically have understood the

152 See supra note 33.
154 Id. The court noted that this approach to applying the undue burden test had support in some but not all federal courts applying the undue burden standard. Id. at *7–8 (discussing other courts’ rulings).
155 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014).
Texas criminal abortion ban as a form of sex discrimination reflecting sex stereotypes. As recently as 1961, the Court had cited women's special role as mothers to uphold their discriminatory exclusion from mandatory jury service on the basis of their sex.\textsuperscript{156} As of 1973, it had not yet held that women even are entitled to heightened protection under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause for the most blatant forms of sex discrimination. That came in 1976, with the adoption of “intermediate scrutiny” for sex discrimination in \textit{Craig v. Boren.}\textsuperscript{157} In between, in 1974, the Court wrote that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination—just discrimination between pregnant persons and non-pregnant persons.\textsuperscript{158} Even forty years later, a majority of the Justices fail to recognize the sex equality dimension of government actions that prevent women from being able to decide whether and when to become mothers. In 2007, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's four-Justice dissent in \textit{Gonzales v. Carhart} chastised the five-Justice majority for using reasoning in upholding the federal “partial birth” abortion ban that “reflects ancient notions about women's place in the family and under the Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.”\textsuperscript{159} Justice Ginsburg famously suggested in 1985, before she had joined the Court, that the Equal Protection Clause might provide a stronger basis than the Due Process Clause for protecting women from abortion restrictions.\textsuperscript{160} State court rulings that carefully and persuasively consider their own constitutional guarantees of equality—whether in the form of equal protection guarantees, equal rights amendments, or equal privilege and immunities provisions—also could guide the U.S. Supreme Court to appreciate the full extent of constitutional harms.

\section*{IV. State Courts and Reproductive Rights Beyond Challenges to Abortion Restrictions}

As the U.S. Supreme Court in \textit{Roe v. Wade} correctly noted, “the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.”\textsuperscript{161} From early on, the assault on \textit{Roe} has included efforts to change the legal status of the unborn more generally. For decades, a principal strategy for recriminalizing abortion has been to seek the creation of separate legal rights for fertilized eggs, embryos, and uses in as many contexts as possible, under state and federal law.\textsuperscript{162} In their most sweeping

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{156} Hoyt \textit{v. Florida}, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
\item \textsuperscript{157} 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
\item \textsuperscript{158} Geduldig \textit{v. Aiello}, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
\item \textsuperscript{159} 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{160} Ginsburg, \textit{supra} note 56.
\item \textsuperscript{161} 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
form, proposed amendments to the federal and state constitutions would confer constitutional personhood from the moment of conception. Thus far, all such efforts at constitutional personhood have failed, often following expensive campaigns in which supporters of reproductive justice seek to educate about the far-reaching consequences that could result not just in the abortion context, but also for contraception, assisted reproductive technologies, and the rights of women to bodily integrity and equal personhood. Proposed personhood amendments, however, persist and appeared on the ballot in November 2014 in North Dakota and Colorado—notwithstanding the voters’ rejections of Colorado personhood amendments in 2008 and 2010.

More pernicious, less sweeping efforts abound to create separate rights for developing fetuses and embryos in a variety of circumstances under state and federal law. Some of these efforts are framed as for the purpose of protecting pregnant women. A principal example are feticide laws in thirty-eight states that typically apply when a pregnant woman is the target of a vicious assault—but that define the victim as the unborn, rather than the woman. Other efforts identify the pregnant woman herself as the direct target of state prosecutors, courts, or legislatures. These types of legal actions result in published judicial opinions in far fewer cases than challenges to abortion restrictions, but National Advocates for Pregnant Women (NAPW) published a comprehensive study in April 2014 examining 413 such cases between 1973 and 2005.


167 See, e.g., Lynn Paltrow, Pregnant Drugs Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALBANY L. REV. 999, 1035–38 (1999); Nora Caplan-Bricker, How the ‘Crack Baby’ Scare Armed the Pro-Life Cause, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115396/how-crack-baby-scare-armed-pro-life-cause [http://perma.cc/9BRN-3AYA]. “[T]he Wisconsin [‘Cocaine Mom’] law was ushered through legislatures in 1997 by anti-abortion lobbyists, not drug crusaders. It missed the war on cocaine by almost a decade, and was written after the idea that drug abuse was uniquely damaging to fetuses had been roundly debunked. . . . Rather, the law Beltran is challenging — along with others of its kind — was a sidelong way of codifying the argument that a fetus is a person with rights separate from its mother’s.”)

168 Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 15.
NAPW also has identified 250 additional cases since 2005. The following excerpt from the report’s executive summary conveys why the composition of state courts is critical to safeguarding women’s rights and health, particularly women of color and poor women, who are disproportionately the victims of these discriminatory actions:

In each of the 413 cases, pregnancy was a necessary element and the consequences included: arrests; incarceration; increases in prison or jail sentences; detentions in hospitals, mental institutions and drug treatment programs; and forced medical interventions, including surgery. Data showed that state authorities have used post-Roe measures including feticide laws and anti-abortion laws recognizing separate rights for fertilized eggs, embryos and fetuses as the basis for depriving pregnant women – whether they were seeking to end a pregnancy or go to term – of their physical liberty. The findings make clear that if so called “personhood” measures are enacted, not only will more women who have abortions be arrested, such measures would create the legal basis for depriving all pregnant women of their status as full persons under the law.

This study also makes clear that efforts aimed at public opinion and political engagement are critical, both in bolstering state courts in their ability to protect against infringement of rights and in building democratic pressure against the punitive laws and executive actions that drive these cases.

Several examples just from 2014 illustrate the diversity of contexts in which state courts have confronted efforts to specially punish or control women on the basis of pregnancy. A New Jersey woman was reported to child and family service authorities for potential abuse or neglect for receiving medically prescribed methadone treatment while pregnant. A New York woman was convicted of second-degree manslaughter and sentenced to three to nine years in prison for being involved in a car accident while eight-months pregnant; a jury acquitted her of any wrongdoing with respect to the deaths of the driver and passenger of the other car involved in the accident and thus declined to find that she was under the influence of any substance, yet found her guilty of manslaughter due to the loss of her pregnancy. A Utah woman was charged with felony child endangerment for continuing to use illegal drugs while pregnant due to her methamphetamine addiction. A sixteen-year-old Mississippi woman was charged with

169 Id.
depraved heart murder when she suffered a stillbirth allegedly following illegal drug use.\textsuperscript{174} Two Indiana women were charged with feticide, one for attempting suicide while pregnant,\textsuperscript{175} and another for allegedly attempting to self-abort.\textsuperscript{176} A Texas court finally ruled in favor of a pregnant woman who had been pronounced legally dead but was kept on “life support” for eight weeks against the wishes of her family and the directives in her living will.\textsuperscript{177} A Pennsylvanian woman was arrested for obtaining medication that would induce abortion at the request of her pregnant daughter and ultimately was charged with a felony count for medical consultation and judgment and with misdemeanors for simple assault and endangering the welfare of a child.\textsuperscript{178} Finally, a New York woman, the mother of three children, is suing a hospital for performing a cesarean section against her express wishes, which resulted in her suffering a perforated bladder.\textsuperscript{179}

In all contexts, the ultimate goal and cumulative effect of legislating, litigating, and prosecuting for the recognition of fetal personhood is to change societal attitudes in favor of a conception of fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses, at all stages of development, as entities independent of pregnant women. This goal, in turn, subjects pregnant women to state control and punishment based on perceived fetal interests that the government privileges above those of the woman.\textsuperscript{180} Although largely

\begin{itemize}
\item Due to a lack of scientific support for the claim that she used a criminalized drug while pregnant, charges were ultimately dismissed. \textit{Mississippi Murder Charge Against Pregnant Teen Dismissed}, \textit{Nat\textsuperscript{a}l Advocates for Pregnant Women} (Apr. 4, 2014), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2014/04/mississippi_murder_charge_against_teens.php [http://perma.cc/8UA8-4KKT]; \textit{Kate Sheppard, Mississippi Could Soon Jail Women for Stillbirths, Miscarriages}, \textit{Mother Jones} (May 23, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/buckhalter-mississippi-stillbirth-manslaughter [http://perma.cc/Y7QN-CM2U].
\item After spending over two years in prison awaiting charges on murder and attempted feticide, Bei Bei Shuai pleaded guilty to criminal recklessness, a class B misdemeanor, and was released upon a sentencing of 178 days time served. \textit{Susan Guyett, Murder Charges Dropped Against Indiana Woman Who Ate Rat Poison While Pregnant}, \text{REUTERS} (Aug. 2, 2013).
\item \textit{Hard to Imagine a More Absolute Denial of a Woman’s Personhood}, \textit{Nat\textsuperscript{a}l Advocates for Pregnant Women} (Jan. 19, 2014), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2014/01/hard_to_imagine_a_more_absolut.php [http://perma.cc/Q6W-8BUQ].
\item \textit{Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law}, 100 \textit{Yale L.J.} 1281, 1315 (1991) (“[T]he only point of recognizing fetal personhood, or a separate fetal entity, is to assert the interests of the fetus against the pregnant woman.”); \textit{Maya Manian, Lessons From Personhood’s Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side Effects on Women’s Health}, 74 \textit{Ohio St. L.J.} 75, 78 (2013) (“After years of an incremental approach to restricting access to abortion care, the movement to establish legal personhood at the moment of conception has recently revived. ... While the language and form of these proposals vary from state to state (legislative bills ... versus ballot initiatives ...), each essentially attempts to secure legal rights for pre-born human beings starting from the moment of fertilization or conception.”).
\end{itemize}
motivated by anti-abortion ends, the injurious recognition of separate rights for fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses extends to circumstances in which a woman desires to continue a pregnancy and bear a child. Rather than support women’s strong interests in having a healthy pregnancy and giving birth to a healthy child when she chooses to continue a pregnancy, the government, through the creation of separate rights for embryos and fetuses, creates a potentially adversarial legal relationship between a woman and the State.  

Because the recognition of this separate legal status is actually counterproductive to healthy pregnancies and children, this approach is opposed by major medical and public health organizations, including the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Public Health Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the National Association of Public Child Welfare Administrators, among others.

Thus far, in the vast majority of cases targeting pregnant women, state appellate courts have rejected these efforts, which typically entail requests to expand judicially, beyond their plain language and legislative intent, existing criminal and civil laws to make pregnant women legally liable for the outcome of their pregnancies. One notable example led to an opinion of the highest court governing the District of Columbia, wherein the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed a court-ordered cesarean section—but not until after the surgery had been performed and contributed to the death of the pregnant women, who was ill with cancer and did not survive the surgery.  

The baby was not viable and died two days later. The court declared: “[E]very person has the right, under the common law and the Constitution, to accept or refuse medical treatment.”

In several published opinions, however, state courts have ruled against women in sweeping decisions that articulate a legal theory for state control of women that would support overturning Roe and also undermine women’s autonomy and bodily integrity—essentially, their full legal personhood—on the basis of pregnancy or even the capacity to become pregnant. For example, on April 18, 2014, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the word “child” in a state law includes fertilized eggs such that women may be arrested for using a controlled substance while pregnant, even in the absence of harm. Two concurring justices, writing separately, went beyond even this sweeping opinion, relying on Biblical citations and God’s authority to call for Roe to be overturned.

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183 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).

184 Id. at 1247.

185 Ex parte Hicks, No. 110620, 2014 WL 1508698 (Ala. Apr. 18, 2014).
overturned\textsuperscript{186} and equating a woman who has an abortion to a “killer.”\textsuperscript{187} Governmental authority to deprive women of rights and liberty because of hypothetical harm to their future children creates a slippery slope that has led already to forced medical interventions, civil commitment, and criminal convictions that have no analogue outside of pregnancy and cut to the core of self-determination. Independent state courts are essential to a proper interpretation of state statutes never intended to apply to such circumstances and to the development of common law and constitutional principles that respect individual autonomy and advance reproductive justice.

\section{V. Challenges and Recommendations}

Reproductive rights advocates toil throughout the fifty states to protect women from scores of new pregnancy-based infringements imposed each year in what seems a bit like a cruel game of Whac-a-Mole, the arcade game where a player uses a mallet to strike down “moles” that unceasingly and more frequently pop up from holes despite the player’s best efforts. Consider abortion restrictions: in the ten years from 2001 to 2010, states enacted 189 new abortion restrictions.\textsuperscript{188} In the three years from 2011 to 2013, they enacted 205 restrictions.\textsuperscript{189} Consider one state, South Dakota, where anti-abortion forces work to close the state’s single abortion clinic.\textsuperscript{190} Not content with the burdens of a twenty-four-hour “waiting period” that often forces women to make two long trips, in 2011, the legislature tripled the mandatory delay to seventy-two hours.\textsuperscript{191} This restriction will prove difficult for many women in a large state with one clinic, and terribly so for women struggling financially.\textsuperscript{192} Even worse, the legislature decreed that during this delay, women must endure a visit to a “crisis pregnancy center”\textsuperscript{193} for anti-abortion “counseling” aimed at talking them out of having an abortion, which often involves the use of medically inaccurate information.\textsuperscript{194} Fortunately, a federal district court has temporarily enjoined the portion of the law forcing women to visit a crisis pregnancy center.\textsuperscript{195} In 2013, the South Dakota legislature amended what already

\textsuperscript{186} Id. (Moore, J., concurring specially).
\textsuperscript{187} Id. (Parker, J., concurring specially).
\textsuperscript{188} Nash et al., supra note 7.
\textsuperscript{189} Id.
\textsuperscript{193} Sheppard, supra note 192.
was the most draconian waiting-period law in the country to declare that weekends and holidays would not count toward the three days; on holiday weekends, the mandatory delay would be six days.\textsuperscript{196}

James Bopp, leader of both anti-abortion and anti-campaign finance regulation efforts, described the strategy behind this shotgun legal assault in a 2007 memo coauthored with Richard Coleson:

Efforts to educate, legislate, and litigate not only keep the abortion issue alive and change hearts and minds for long-term benefit, but they also translate into more disfavor for all abortions, which in turn reduces abortions. This is also true of such other “incremental” efforts as clinic regulations (which often shut down clinics), parental involvement, waiting periods, and informed consent. … The Supreme Court’s current makeup assures that a declared federal constitutional right to abortion remains secure for the present. … Eschewing incremental efforts to limit abortion where legally and politically possible makes the … strategic error of believing that the pro-life issue can be kept alive without such incremental efforts.\textsuperscript{197}

Efforts to respond to those that seek to “shut down clinics,” and instead to work to advance reproductive justice for all, similarly must be multi-pronged and “educate, legislate, and litigate.” This essay concludes with four recommendations for encouraging state courts to play their full independent role in the protection of women’s reproductive rights.

First, and most obvious, affirmative litigation and the defense of women and reproductive health providers in the state courts must continue and should be pursued with an eye toward public education. As frustrating as it can be to combat the anti-abortion incremental strategy, reproductive rights advocates know their efforts are not a futile game. For every law enjoined and every clinic door kept open—and there have been many—numerous women and families retain their autonomy and dignity in making some of the most important decisions of their lives. Where the state court victory is built on an independent interpretation of a state constitution, that precedent may lay the groundwork for future rulings within that state and beyond, informing other state judiciaries and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme Court looks to the states when considering the “history and tradition” that informs interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s protection of “liberty,” and recent developments in the states are most relevant to our evolving understandings, as Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority in \textit{Lawrence v. Texas}:

\begin{quote}
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{197} Bopp & Coleson, \textit{supra} note 33, at 6.
presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.

We also, however, must address a core and limiting reality: many state courts are unreceptive or even hostile to reproductive rights claims, particularly in “red” and “purple” states where damaging laws and actions are most prevalent. The often-politicized method of judicial selection provides a partial explanation. Unlike federal judges who enjoy a measure of independence thanks to lifetime tenure guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution, most states choose their judges at least in part by popular election, making judges far more vulnerable to harmful political influences. Thirty-nine states conduct elections of some kind for state judges, including twenty-two that hold competitive elections and others that require retention votes. Judges who must run for office are vulnerable to the same distorting influences of money in politics that generally undermine our representative democracy and have been made worse by U.S. Supreme Court decisions that interpret the First Amendment as radically limiting the ability of Congress and state legislatures to regulate money in politics. The same five Justices who comprise the Court’s current bare majority in cases that invalidate campaign finance regulations also comprise the five-Justice majority that upheld the federal criminal ban on “partial birth abortions.” The New Politics of Judicial Elections, 2011–12, a comprehensive report by Justice at Stake, the Brennan Center for Justice, and the National Institute on Money in State Politics, found state judicial races indistinguishable from ordinary political campaigns in many respects, including unprecedented levels of independent expenditures, difficulty identifying donors, and misleading targeting of candidates on substantive issues. As Alicia Bannon of the

Brennan Center for Justice noted in response to the 2014 announcement of a multimillion dollar Republican Party initiative to back ideologically conservative judges, “We’ve really seen judicial races become increasingly like an ordinary political contest, where judges essentially become politicians with robes.”\(^{206}\) In many states, anti-abortion organizations have become central political players in judicial as well as other elections; they have supported or opposed judicial candidates based on predicted rulings in reproductive rights cases, and they have targeted judges for defeat in retention elections based on past rulings.\(^{207}\)

Attention to the method of judicial selection, therefore, is a second essential component in promoting independent state courts that will fulfill their core responsibilities to protect rights and uphold state constitutions. Many leading jurists and public interest organizations have offered compelling reasons to insulate state judges from special interests that otherwise inappropriately bias judicial decision-making and discourage controversial rulings.\(^{208}\) The specifics vary and are open to fair debate, but two forms of reform are clearly superior to privately funded competitive elections: systems of public financing, such as those in place in New Mexico and West Virginia,\(^{209}\) and, even more promising, merit selection, employed in some fashion, for some courts, by two-thirds of states.\(^{210}\) Since her retirement, former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has been a leader in advocating for systems of merit selection, which currently are used to select all judges in only thirteen states; as she explained succinctly when advocating for one particular such system in July...

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2014, “You just can’t have a fair and impartial system if you have cash in the court.”211 Typically, merit selection entails a nonpartisan commission that evaluates potential nominees and recommends the best among them to the governor, who then must choose from the commission’s list. A retention election or evaluation by a committee follows the initial term of service.212

Merit selection, however, faces formidable opposition, including from abortion opponents who succeeded in their opposition in Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.213 In both Minnesota and Pennsylvania, the states’ leading anti-abortion organizations were credited with defeating the efforts with threats to “score” a vote for merit selection as a “pro-abortion” vote when considering whether to endorse legislators up for re-election.214 Even where merit selection is in place, retention elections offer opportunities for politicization, as is well known from the experience in Iowa, where a unanimous decision invalidating Iowa’s refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry led to nationally funded campaigns that resulted in the defeat of three Iowa Supreme Court justices in 2010;215 a fourth justice survived a retention challenge in 2012.216 Anti-abortion groups also have joined with others to weaken merit selection systems, in efforts akin to the incremental efforts to make abortions services unavailable, state-by-state. For example, in Florida, Governor Rick Scott has rejected nineteen lists from the state bar recommending nominees to the Judicial Nominating Commission.217 In Alaska, the state nominating commission is composed of three attorneys, three public members, and the chief


215 Bannon et al., supra note 205, at 30–33 (describing the excessively contentious retention election by Iowa Supreme Court Justice David Wiggins).

216 Bannon et al., supra note 205, at 30–33.

justice of the Alaska Supreme Court; anti-abortion organizations are seeking to add three new public members to the nominating commission, in order to dilute the votes of the attorneys. Kansans for Life has made several attempts since 2010 to eliminate merit selection, including a successful effort in 2013 to eliminate it for the selection of Kansas Court of Appeals judges, and a 2014 announcement that they now are targeting the Kansas Supreme Court. In both Alaska and Kansas, anti-abortion and anti-campaign finance regulation lawyer James Bopp filed lawsuits seeking to change the judicial selection processes. Anti-abortion groups are open about their motivation. A spokesperson for Kansans for Life, for example, explained, “We have a pro-life house and a pro-life senate and a pro-life governor. . . . We pass pro-life legislation—and we get sued. The next frontier is the courts.” Despite these opportunities for harmful politicization about which advocates for judicial independence must remain vigilant, merit selection remains less vulnerable to politicization than contested elections.

A third initiative to encourage state court independence is recusal reform, the need for which was explained by the American Bar Association and highlighted by the Supreme Court’s 2009 ruling in *Caperton v. Massey* that the plaintiff’s due process rights were violated by the defendant’s extraordinary level of campaign spending. The American Bar Association called for states to adopt recusal procedures that counter the potential influence of campaign expenditures. The Center for American Progress has developed a comprehensive system for evaluating the efficacy of recusal rules in the thirty-nine states that elect judges and found only eight states had satisfactory practices. The Brennan Center for Justice has issued detailed recommendations for recusal reform, both substantive standards and procedures that are designed to maintain the fairness and impartiality of the courts and the public’s perception of fairness.


221 Greenburg, *supra* note 206 (internal quotation marks omitted).

222 *State Court Issues: Recusal, JUSTICE AT STAKE*, http://www.justiceatstake.org/issues/state_court_issues/recusal/ [http://perma.cc/3A73-TUTE] (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) (citing the American Bar Association for the principle that “[f]ew actions jeopardize public trust in the judicial process more than a judge’s failure to recuse in a case brought by or against a substantial contributor”).


225 Corriher & Pavia, *supra* note 224, at 3.

A final component of a strategy to ensure that state courts fulfill their role in protecting fundamental rights would aim to improve popular and political understandings, at the state and grassroots level, of the centrality of reproductive rights to women’s health and equality, as well as to the health of their families and society. Whatever the method of their appointment and retention, judges do not stray far from popular sentiment in fulfilling their constitutional responsibility to protect controversial rights and disfavored groups from political majorities. Governors making merit appointments and reappointments typically also will be influenced by political and popular sentiments. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, for example, pledged to use his appointment authority to move the state courts to the ideological right, but political realities hindered him. Thus, any strategy to secure state or federal constitutional protection for women’s reproductive rights must attend not only to constitutional interpretation, litigation, and judicial selection, but also directly to state and local politics — and, even more broadly, to popular attitudes about pregnancy, contraception, abortion, sexuality, and women. Success in the state courts — as in the legislatures and federal courts — ultimately depends upon continuing to reach Americans’ hearts and minds.

In sum, women’s fundamental rights to control their own childbearing are under serious attack from several fronts, with harm to men and children as well. The targets, of course, are mothers, wives, sisters, daughters; most women who have abortions are mothers. Many tools, both offensive and defensive, will prove vital in their defense, including the position of state courts as potential bastions with the power to shield those within their borders from the onslaught of attacks. Essential to promoting state courts’ ability to protect individual rights from infringement by popular majorities is promoting the health of our democracy and bolstering esteem for those individual rights. All of these efforts, too, will build momentum toward the ultimate end: full protection of women’s reproductive rights at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Congress. Reproductive justice demands an end to the state-by-state patchwork of terribly uneven protections under which the most vulnerable women — and their families — suffer the worst indignities and deprivations.


Appendix A
Compilation of Current Cases and Ballot Measures

Please note the use of the following acronyms: ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), CRR (Center for Reproductive Rights), NAPW (National Advocates for Pregnant Women), and PPFA (Planned Parenthood Federation of America).

Pending and Recent (2014) State Court Challenges to Abortion Restrictions


After a successful challenge to a parental consent requirement in state court, Alaska enacted via referendum a law that mandates parental notification for women under the age of eighteen seeking an abortion. CRR, ACLU and PPFA—representing Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest and two physicians—argue that the law violates young Alaskan women’s constitutional rights to equal protection and privacy, as well as the physicians’ right to due process. The court below upheld the parental notification requirement, finding that the law may protect and enhance familial relations in some instances. The appeal was argued before the Alaska Supreme Court on February 19, 2014.


ACLU, PPFA, and CRR filed an action in Alaska state court challenging a state regulation enacted in late 2013, and a state statute passed shortly thereafter, that defy the 2001 Alaska Supreme Court decision holding that the state’s Medicaid system may not discriminate in the type of care it provides and therefore must provide funding for all medically necessary abortions if providing other medical services. The 2001 decision, which serves as the basis for the 2013 challenge, is
a product of a successful state constitutional challenge by ACLU and PPFA. The statute and the regulation would severely curtail physician discretion and harm indigent Alaskan women by limiting Medicaid funding to cases where the physician certifies that the abortion is “medically necessary to avoid a threat of serious risk to the physical health of the woman from continuation of the pregnancy due to impairment of a major bodily function.” In addition, the regulation violates the 2001 decision in its deliberate exclusion of most coverage for women with mental health conditions, excepting those conditions that occur in conjunction with the need to “avoid a threat of serious risk to the physical health.” The plaintiff, Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest, argues that by erecting barriers for Medicaid coverage of abortion that do not exist for other services and substantially restricting access to abortion for indigent women, the regulation violates the equal protection and privacy guarantees of the Alaska Constitution. In addition, the plaintiff also alleges that the regulation violates the state constitutional right to health and the Administrative Procedure Act. As of July 2014, the Superior Court of Alaska has issued a preliminary injunction on the regulation. Trial is scheduled for February 2015.

Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble (Arizona) (pending; complaint filed April 7, 2014).

Planned Parenthood, together with Arizona abortion providers, brought suit to invalidate an Arizona law requiring abortion clinics to administer medication abortion in an outdated and burdensome manner, in compliance with federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) protocol. The plaintiffs claim that the law does not conform to the Department of Health Services’ self-imposed rulemaking process, and, therefore, violates Arizona administrative law. The plaintiffs also argue that the law unconstitutionally violates state non-delegation doctrine by effectively delegating Arizona legislative power over the regulation of abortions to the FDA and drug companies. On June 6, 2014, the state court case was stayed pending resolution of a parallel federal court case that challenges the law on federal grounds. On August 12, 2014, the court set oral arguments for December 5, 2014.
Appendix A

Lathrop v. Deal
(Georgia) (pending; complaint filed November 30, 2012).

ACLU challenged Georgia legislation that “[w]ith very narrow exceptions . . . bans all abortions starting at 20 weeks,” and imposes felony sanctions for the performance of such abortions. ACLU asserts that the law effectively compels “a physician caring for a woman to wait for her condition to deteriorate until she was in a medical emergency before offering her abortion care necessary to protect her health.” The plaintiffs argue that the law infringes upon guarantees contained in the Georgia Constitution, namely equal protection, privacy, and due process. The law was preliminarily enjoined on December 24, 2012. Both parties’ summary judgment motions and the State’s motion to dismiss are pending.


Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Iowa Board of Medicine
(Iowa) (pending; complaint filed September 30, 2013).

PPFA brought suit in an Iowa court objecting to a state regulation that bans telemedicine or “webcam” abortions, which allow a physician to remotely prescribe mifepristone after electronic consultation. PPFA argues that the regulation is unconstitutional, as foreclosing women’s access to telemedicine abortions constitutes an “undue burden.” The law has been enjoined since November 2013. In March, the court barred evidence that PPFA sought to introduce to show that the regulation may have been ideologically motivated and that the governor’s office may have colluded with anti-abortion advocacy groups. The trial judge rejected all of Planned Parenthood’s claims and granted judgment dismissing the judicial review claims, though separate 1983 claims still exist. Planned Parenthood has filed an appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court and moved for a continuation of the stay originally granted by the trial court while the appeal is heard by the Iowa Supreme Court.


Appendix A

Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Moser, M.D.
(Kansas) (pending; complaint filed November 9, 2011).

The plaintiffs brought suit contending that a state-imposed regulatory scheme violates state constitutional protections of equal protection and privacy. The directive prohibits abortion procedures in any medical establishment not licensed as an abortion facility. The plaintiffs argue that the provision is injurious to the health of women who may not be able to procure an abortion, including instances where immediate services are needed to preserve the woman’s health. The plaintiffs also assert that the provision unjustifiably and discriminatorily singles out those Kansas physicians who provide abortion services. On November 10, 2011, the judge granted a restraining order, and on August 8, 2012, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied. The case is currently in discovery.


Hodes & Nauser MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt
(Kansas) (pending; complaint filed June 21, 2013).

CRR brought suit on behalf of two Kansas physicians, a father-daughter medical team that provides a full range of ob-gyn services, challenging numerous abortion restrictions in HB 2253. Among them: a requirement that physicians inform patients that “the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being,” that “by no later than 20 weeks from fertilization, the unborn child has the physical structures necessary to experience pain,” and that abortions may increase the incidence of premature birth in future pregnancies; a limitation on the medical emergency exception to the mandatory waiting period; a ban on abortion providers from working or volunteering in public schools; a ban on the University of Kansas Medical School faculty teaching how to perform abortions; a removal of coverage of medically necessary abortions services from public health plans; a ban on sex selection abortions; and a block on tax breaks for abortion providers. CRR argues that the legislation violates protections afforded by the state constitution, including a woman’s fundamental right to abortion and equal protection. In June 2013, the state court issued a temporary injunction against several components of the act. In April 2014, a new law was enacted that repeals parts of the enjoined provisions. The parties agreed to lift the temporary injunction on the biased counseling provision. As of mid-May 2014, cross motions for judgment on the pleadings were fully briefed.


Walker v. Jesson
(Minnesota) (denied review by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, August 5, 2014).

Minnesota’s funding structure covers therapeutic abortions, as a result of a 1995 decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Doe v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995). In November 2012, two Minnesota taxpayers (represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom) sued the State arguing that public funds were being impermissibly allocated to elective abortions because the system for verifying the nature of the abortion allows physicians to indicate that “the abortion is done for other health reasons,” even when the abortion may not be medically necessary. Pro-Choice Resources (a plaintiff in the Doe v. Gomez case), represented by CRR, filed a motion to intervene as a defendant. The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss and denied Pro-Choice Resources motion to intervene as moot. The plaintiffs appealed. On November 4, 2013, CRR filed an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief on behalf of Pro-Choice Resources and ACLU of Minnesota submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of itself to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. ACLU of Minnesota’s brief asserted that the plaintiffs’ claims were futile, as the Minnesota constitutional privacy protection guarantees a woman and her physician considerable privacy regarding her decision to pursue and abortion. On May 5, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the trial-court’s judgment rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims based on the appellants’ failure to establish taxpayer standing. On June 3, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and the Supreme Court of Minnesota denied review on August 5, 2014.


A13-0986 (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014).


Planned Parenthood v. State of Montana
(Montana) (pending; complaint filed May 30, 2013).

Planned Parenthood of Montana (PPMT) and its medical director, on behalf of themselves and their patients, filed an action challenging two limitations on minors’ access to abortion: a law requiring parental notification of abortion for minors under the age of 16, enacted by referendum after the governor’s veto (the ‘2012 Referendum’) and a law requiring parental consent for abortion for all minors under the age of 18 (the ‘2013 Act’). The plaintiffs argued that the unconstitutionally onerous restrictions violate minors’ rights to privacy and equal protection as guaranteed by the Montana State Constitution, as well as Montana’s express constitutional protection of the rights of minors, and also violate plaintiffs’ due process rights. The plaintiffs further argued that the state was barred from defending the two challenged laws by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because a Montana district court had already found a nearly identical law unconstitutional in 1999. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to keep the 2013 Act from going into effect for the duration of the lawsuit, and the court subsequently entered that preliminary injunction. The state moved for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether they were permitted to defend the laws at all, and by agreement of the plaintiffs, the parties suspended argument and briefing on the other issues in the case and argued just the issue of collateral estoppel before the Montana district court. On January 31, 2014, the district court issued an opinion and order granting summary judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor on the issue of collateral estoppel and holding that the state was barred from defending the 2012 Referendum and the 2013 Act. On February 10, 2014, the district court certified its summary judgment order as final for the purposes of appeal, and the state appealed that order to the Montana Supreme Court. The state filed its brief on June 2, 2014, and Planned Parenthood filed its response brief on August 1, 2014. The state’s reply brief is due to the Supreme Court on September 12, 2014.


MKB Management Corp. v. Burdick
(North Dakota) (pending; complaint filed July 18, 2011).

CRR filed a petition in state court on behalf of MKB Management Corp. (doing business as Red River Women’s Clinic), the sole abortion provider in North Dakota. The petition challenges several provisions of House Bill 1297, which essentially bans all medication abortions. CRR asserts that the law violates state constitutional protections, including equal privileges and immunities and rights to bodily integrity
and autonomy. The trial court granted a temporary injunction blocking the
enforcement of the challenged provisions shortly after the complaint was filed on July
21, 2011. Later, the complaint was amended in May, 2013 to also challenge SB 2305,
which requires physicians performing abortions to have admitting privileges at a
nearby hospital. The court issued a memorandum opinion and order for temporary
injunction in February, 2012 and a permanent injunction in July 2013. The state
appealed and argument was held before the North Dakota Supreme Court on
December 11, 2013.

management-corp-v-burdick-1.


MKBvBurdick_Perm_Injunction.pdf.

Repro Health Watch, In the News, available at http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/
News2?id=34416.

Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. v. Kasich
(Ohio) (pending; complaint filed October 9, 2013).

ACLU, representing Preterm-Cleveland, a nonprofit women’s health ambulatory
surgical facility, brought suit in an Ohio court arguing that House Bill 59 violates
the Ohio Constitution. The legislation, signed into law on June 30, 2013, requires
that (1) physicians perform ultrasounds at least twenty-four hours prior to an
abortion procedure; (2) non-hospital surgical facilities execute written agreements
with hospitals outlining procedures for admitting patients; and (3) federal funding
from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families be channeled to private, nonprofit
organizations that promote childbirth and alternatives to abortion. The ACLU of
Ohio argues that the law violates the Ohio Constitution’s one-subject rule.

ACLU (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.acluohio.org/cases/preterm-cleveland-inc-v-kasich-et-al

Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice v. Oklahoma State
Board of Pharmacy
(Oklahoma) (won; complaint filed August 8, 2013).

CRR filed suit challenging an Oklahoma law that requires women age seventeen and
older to present a form of identification to a pharmacist when attempting to acquire
the emergency contraception Plan B One-Step. The FDA has approved the drug for
over-the-counter disbursement for all women and teens of childbearing age. The
petitioners argue that the law violates the Oklahoma Constitution’s single-subject rule
and women’s due process and equal protection guarantees. On January 23, 2014, the trial court judge granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the law clearly violates the state’s “single-subject rule.” Defendants did not appeal that ruling.


**Balquinta v. Texas Dep’t of State Health**
(Texas) (Supreme Court of Texas appeal filed on June 26, 2014).

Planned Parenthood brought suit challenging new administrative regulations that disqualify health providers who affiliate with providers of abortion from receiving state funds under the new Texas Women’s Health Program. The plaintiffs claim that the Department of State Health Services lacks statutory authority to exclude Planned Parenthood from participating in the funding program. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ petition for temporary injunction, but ruled that the case could proceed over the State’s jurisdictional objections. The State appealed the jurisdictional ruling, and on April 9, 2014, the Texas Court of Appeals issued an opinion holding that the trial court has jurisdiction over Planned Parenthood’s claims under the Administrative Procedures Act. The State has filed a petition for review of that decision with the Supreme Court of Texas. Planned Parenthood has reserved its right to pursue federal constitutional claims in federal court should it ultimately be unsuccessful in the state courts.


**Falls Church Med. Ctr. v. Vir. Bd. Of Health**
(Virginia) (pending; complaint filed June 10, 2013).

A Virginia clinic filed an administrative appeal petition objecting to regulations issued by the state that regulate clinics primarily through mandating strict building standards. The petitioners argue that although they are framed as promoting healthy, hospital-like facilities for clinics, the new regulations actually do not further women’s health, are prohibitively expensive and “treat abortion facilities much more harshly than general hospitals, in a way that is arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the due process clause of the Virginia Constitution.” Trial is scheduled to begin August 21, 2014 and a subsequent hearing is set for December 5, 2014.


Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. JB Van Hollen (Wisconsin) (pending; complaint filed February 8, 2013).

Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin challenged a law barring Internet consultations with abortion providers. On July 17, 2014, a Wisconsin Dane County Circuit judge ruled that doctors can prescribe medicine that will induce abortions and do not have to be present when it is being taken. The case is now pending in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.


Pending Pregnancy-Related Legal Actions Against Women


While pregnant, a New Jersey woman received medically prescribed methadone treatment. Her child was diagnosed with symptoms of neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS)—an expected, transitory and treatable side effect of the drug. Based on the NAS diagnosis, the woman was reported to child and family service authorities. A trial court found that the woman was guilty of abuse and neglect. On appeal, a mid-level appellate court concluded that “[w]here there is evidence of actual impairment, [at birth] it is immaterial whether the drugs were from a legal or illicit source.” National Advocates for Pregnant Women (NAPW) argues that the trial court’s ruling “created a dramatic and legislatively unauthorized expansion” of the State’s power over pregnant women, enabling the state to supervise women who become pregnant, and penalize them if they cannot guarantee healthy birth outcomes or if they are perceived as having risked harm to their “unborn” children. (NAPW has filed amicus briefs in successful challenges to similar civil child welfare charges that had been brought in New Jersey against a woman who refuse HIV treatment while pregnant; against a woman who refused to pre-authorize cesarean surgery that turned out to be unnecessary; and against a woman who gave birth to a healthy baby who tested positive for cocaine). In an amicus brief submitted to the court on behalf of 76 organizations and experts in related health fields—including the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Psychiatric Association, the American
Public Health Association, the American Society of Addiction Medicine, and the Medical Society of New Jersey—NAPW urged the court to overturn the lower courts’ decision, which NAPW argues would effectively ban pregnant women from obtaining the standard care of treatment for addiction to opioids—a standard recommended by the federal government, international health organizations, and the State of New Jersey. The brief also argues that no health condition experienced at birth by a newborn should provide the basis for a child welfare action. To permit such actions would set a precedent that makes risk of harm during pregnancy or actual harm (including abortion or contemplating having an abortion) evidence of child abuse or neglect. Amici further warn that a ruling affirming the trial court’s decision could have the “unintended consequence of deterring women from seeking prenatal treatment,” and that this would disproportionately affect low-income women and women of color. The case is being actively litigated in the Supreme Court of New Jersey.


Ex Parte Hicks (Alabama) (Alabama Supreme Court decision issued April 18, 2014).

As described in a press release issued April 22, 2014, NAPW along with “the Drug Policy Alliance and the Southern Poverty Law Center filed an amicus brief in Ankrom on behalf of 49 medical, public health, and health advocacy groups and experts opposing the judicial expansion of the chemical endangerment law to pregnant women and mothers. The Drug Policy Alliance and the Southern Poverty Law Center also filed an amicus brief in Hicks on behalf of medical, public health, and health advocacy groups.” In an 8-to-1 decision issued on April 18, 2014, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a criminal conviction and affirmed the court’s prior ruling in Ex Parte Ankrom. The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Ankrom and Kimbrough reinterpreted Alabama’s 2006 “chemical endangerment of a child” law to permit the prosecution and punishment of women who become pregnant, use any amount of a controlled substance and attempt to carry their pregnancies to term. In this decision, a majority of the court relied on two dictionary definitions of the word “child” to conclude that as a matter of plain language the statute was intended to apply to fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses. (This conclusion would apparently apply to the word child in every Alabama statute if not otherwise defined.) Alabama’s 2006 Chemical Endangerment law, however, does not address pregnant women or pregnancy and was clearly passed to deter people from bringing children to places where controlled substances are produced or distributed, such as methamphetamine laboratories. Because the court found the term “child” unambiguous, it refused to apply the rule of lenity, rejected every other argument relating to actual legislative intent, and claimed that no constitutional arguments had been preserved at the trial level, making arguments about the lack of any state interest served by threatening
and actually arresting pregnant women and new mothers irrelevant. The effect of the ruling is to make the use of any controlled substance, including ones prescribed by physicians, a crime in Alabama. Controlled substances are used in epidurals and in the provision of abortion services. In a concurring opinion in Ankrum, Justice Parker explained how the plain language ruling was consistent with a growing body of civil, criminal, health, estate and other laws recognizing the unborn as separate legal persons and concluding that Roe v. Wade is inconsistent with such laws and should be overruled. In Hicks, the court re-affirmed Ankrum, rejected the constitutional argument that the statute failed to give a woman notice that becoming pregnant and using a controlled substance could subject to her this law, and included two concurring opinions explaining the legal basis for overturning Roe, including one that relies on biblical law. NAPW released a statement in response to the ruling, criticizing the breadth of the court’s opinion and the biblical reasoning in the concurrence and warning that “[t]he decisions in Ankrum and Hicks empower police, prosecutors, and prison wardens to oversee prenatal care and motherhood, and by adopting policies that every leading medical group warns will undermine the health, safety and wellbeing of children born and unborn.” More than 120 women have been arrested in Alabama. Challenges to these arrests provide an opportunity to raise numerous constitutional arguments that have not yet been ruled on. NAPW is also seeking plaintiffs who would have standing to challenge the law as judicially rewritten in an affirmative federal law suit.

Alabama Supreme Court Rules That Women Can Be Charged With Chemical Endangerment if They Become Pregnant and Use a Controlled Substance, NATL ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (Apr. 22, 2014), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2014/04/alabama_supreme_court_rules_th.php.


Jennifer Jorgenson v. Comprehensive Women’s Health Center (New York) (New York Court of Appeals accepted case for appellate review).

Jennifer Jorgensen was pregnant when she was in a serious car accident in 2008. As a result of the crash, the driver and passenger of the other car were killed and Ms. Jorgensen went into premature labor. Immediately after the accident, Ms. Jorgensen was transported by helicopter to give birth via emergency cesarean surgery, but her premature infant died five days later. The State of New York charged her with three counts each of aggravated vehicular homicide and second-degree manslaughter, for the deaths of the occupants of the other car and for the death of the newborn. Ms. Jorgensen’s defense counsel, Martin Lorenzotti, failed to seek dismissal of the criminal charges based on the claim that she caused her daughter’s death by being in/and or causing the car accident while pregnant. New York State law does not authorize prosecutions of pregnant women for the outcome of their pregnancies. The first trial in 2011 ended in a mistrial as a result of the jury being unable to come to a verdict. Following a second trial, Ms. Jorgensen was convicted on March 20, 2012 of “one count of second-degree manslaughter in connection with her daughter’s death and acquitted
of four other charges two counts of second-degree manslaughter in connection with the deaths of the driver and passenger of another vehicle, one count of operating a motor vehicle under the combined influence of drugs or alcohol as an ‘A’ misdemeanor, and one count of aggravated vehicular manslaughter.” The jury concluded that Ms. Jorgensen recklessly caused the death of her daughter. Defense attorney Lorenzotti described the verdict as “repugnant” and inconsistent with the verdicts on the two other manslaughter charges. The prosecution asked for the maximum sentence of 5-15 years incarceration. At sentencing, the prosecution attacked Ms. Jorgensen’s character claiming that she “did nothing to put the child’s needs before her own. There was never any concern for [the] baby.” Ms. Jorgensen was eventually sentenced to 3-9 years in prison. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, upheld the conviction in January of 2014. NAPW supported review of an appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the Appellate Division overlooked serious constitutional concerns in permitting the manslaughter charge to stand against a woman for a neonatal death due to a car accident during her pregnancy. The appellate division affirmed the judgment against Jorgensen in a decision issued on January 22, 2014. The New York Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) has accepted this case for review.


Mallory Loyola
(Tennessee) (woman arrested on July 8th and bond set on July 10th, 2014).

In July of 2014, Tennessee became the first state, as a result of legislative action, to make its fetal assault laws applicable to pregnant women. Under this law, women can be punished for the crime of fetal assault if they intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (no intent needed) cause bodily injury to eggs, embryos, or fetuses as a result of an unlawful act or an “unlawful omission.” Special provisions of the law apply to women who illegally use a narcotic drug while pregnant, “if her child is born addicted to or harmed by the narcotic drug and the addiction or harm is a result of her illegal use of a narcotic drug taken while pregnant.” One week after the law went into effect, the new mother was arrested two days after giving birth. She and the apparently healthy newborn both tested positive for amphetamines. If convicted, Loyola faces up to one year of incarceration. Notably, amphetamine is not classified as a narcotic drug. At least two other new mothers have been arrested. NAPW is working with public defenders to challenge the constitutionality of these laws in the state court system. Advocates who opposed the passage of the new law are concerned that it
Appendix A

will disproportionately affect low-income women, women of color, and women from rural areas—women who generally have less access to resources for health care and addiction treatment. The ACLU of Tennessee is pursuing plaintiffs in order to bring an affirmative civil rights challenge to the law and released a statement stating that the new law “unconstitutionally singles out new mothers struggling with addiction for criminal assault charges.”


Munoz v. JPS Hospital (Texas) (ruling to remove life support issued January 24, 2014).

Marlise Munoz, a pregnant 33-year-old Texas woman, experienced a pulmonary embolism and was pronounced legally dead (“brain-dead”) after spending several weeks in a comatose and vegetative state. After the hospital refused to follow her wishes that she not be sustained in such a state, Munoz’s husband filed a petition for declaratory judgment and expedited relief in the Texas District Court on January 1, 2014. The hospital claimed it was acting in accordance with a Texas Health and Safety provision, which requires that “a person may not withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment . . . from a pregnant patient.” Munoz filed the lawsuit on the grounds that the code provision did not apply to brain-dead individuals who are legally dead under Texas law and on the grounds of violations of constitutionally protected rights to privacy and equal protection. On January 24, 2014, Judge R.H. Wallace ruled that the woman should be removed from life support. In a commentary on RH Reality Check, NAPW explained that this case was an example of pregnancy exclusion laws that serve to establish a separate and unequal status for women: “It is hard to imagine a more absolute denial of a woman’s personhood than depriving her of the right to decide her own future, and then literally using her body without permission—possibly for weeks or months—as an object for a fetus to grow in.”


Hard to Imagine a More Absolute Denial of a Woman’s Personhood, NAT'L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (Jan. 19, 2014), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2014/01/hard_to_imagine_a_more_absolut.php.
**Rennie T. Gibbs v. State of Mississippi**  
(Mississippi) (charges dismissed April 13, 2014).

In 2006, when Rennie Gibbs was 16 years old and pregnant, she suffered a stillbirth at 36 weeks. A disgraced medical examiner claimed the stillbirth was caused by her use of cocaine (a claim that is scientifically unsupported). As a result, she was charged with “depraved-heart” homicide under a series of murder laws that Mississippi had made applicable to the “unborn.” Gibbs was represented by NAPW and Robert McDuff, a Mississippi attorney, who argued that that treating women who experience pregnancy losses (for any reason) as murder is unconstitutional. They also argued that the charge, which focused on cocaine use as the cause of the stillbirth, lacked scientific support. In addition, more than 70 organizations were represented in amicus briefs filed on Gibbs’ behalf. Mishka Terplan, an MD, MPH, clinician, and researcher, explained that in the twenty-five years since initial concerns emerged in the 1980s that there may be some association, “no data has been found to support a causal relationship between cocaine use and stillbirths.” McDuff expressed satisfaction that the charge was dismissed, but indicated a need to meet with the District Attorney’s office to ensure that lesser charges will not be filed. In a statement following the dismissal of charges, Lynn Paltrow explained, “The biggest threats to life—born and unborn—do not come from mothers, but rather from poverty, barriers to health care, persistent racism, environmental hazards, and prosecutions like this one. . . . Prosecutions like these increase risks to babies by frightening pregnant women away from care and use tax dollars to expand the criminal justice system rather than to fund programs that actually protect the health of children.”


Kate Sheppard, Mississippi Could Soon Jail Women for Stillbirths, Miscarriages, MOTHER JONES (May 23, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/buckhalter-mississippi-stillbirth-manslaughter.

**Rinat Dray v. Staten Island University Hospital**  
(New York) (pending; complaint filed April 11, 2014).

Rinat Dray, a mother of three, filed a complaint with a New York trial court, claiming multiple grounds for relief after the Staten Island University Hospital that forced her to undergo cesarean surgery and perforated her bladder in the process. The claims brought against the hospital challenge the idea that upon becoming pregnant, or at some stage of pregnancy, women lose their civil rights, including the right to medical decision making. The claims include medical malpractice and an additional complaint brought under New York’s Public Health Law and Patient’s Bill of Rights, which provides the right to be informed, to engage in autonomous medical decision making, and to refuse treatment. Dray explained that she chose her health care provider based on discussions about her desire for a trial of labor, in the hopes of having a vaginal birth after cesarean (known as “VBAC”). She claims that the provider responded positively to her VBAC goal, but once she got to the hospital for delivery, the providers
attempted to coerce her into a surgical delivery. Dray claims that after hours of labor, her examining physician stated he would not examine her unless she consented to surgery, which she again refused. Her medical records include a note by a physician explaining, “[t]he woman has decisional capacity. I have decided to override her refusal to have a C-section.” The complaint alleges that the hospital failed to consult with their bioethics committee or the hospital’s patient advocate and instead sought and obtained approval by the hospital’s legal department. In statements made to RH Reality check, Farah Diaz-Tello, an NAPW staff attorney explained that “[o]verall, forced surgery is extremely rare. However, there are a couple of trends that, unaddressed, raise concerns that this could become more common.” Diaz-Tello further explained that there are two very concerning trends emerging that “treat fetuses, and even fertilized eggs, as though they are separate persons under the law” and threaten pregnant women with surgery, arrest, or legal action—initiated by departments like child services—for engaging in constitutionally protected and medically justified decision making.


Unnamed Woman
(Utah) (charge filed April 21, 2014).

A Utah woman is facing a charge of felony child endangerment based on accusations that she became pregnant and risked harm to her unborn child by using ethamphetamines. The woman had an emergency cesarean section thirty-nine weeks into the pregnancy, a time period that is considered “full-term” and not problematic. In the charge, police wrote, “[b]eing that her child was only 39 weeks gestational age, it was surmised that the use of methamphetamine caused [the woman] to go into labor.” The woman admitted to doctors that she suffers from methamphetamine addiction and that she had used the drug while pregnant. Lynn Paltrow explained the situation to ThinkProgress: “When doctors are responsible for contributing to prematurity because of this practice of encouraging unnecessarily early Cesarean surgery, that’s a health issue. We don’t go around arresting those doctors.” She further explained the dangerous trend that is evolving, adapting otherwise inapplicable statutes to cover the conduct of pregnant women: “It’s a precedent that allows the concept of child endangerment to be applied to all pregnant women. Once you decide that prosecutors and police officers have a role in prenatal care, there is no limiting principle. The child endangerment statute isn’t limited to illegal drugs.”

Appendix A


Indiana v. Patel
(Indiana) (charges filed July 15, 2013; trial scheduled for Sept. 29, 2014)

While the facts in this case are still being clarified, Purvi Patel has been arrested and charged with negligent treatment of a child and feticide, apparently for self-inducing an abortion with medication she obtained from Hong Kong. NAPW is working with local advocates to ensure that challenges are raised to the constitutionality of laws used to criminally punish women who have abortions.


Pennsylvania v. Whalen
(Pennsylvania) (charges filed Dec. 2013)

When Jennifer Whalen’s daughter became pregnant, she couldn’t find a local abortion clinic. Rather than take her daughter out of state, she found an overseas drugstore online that sold medication that could safely end the pregnancy that her daughter did not want to continue. Two weeks after taking the medication, her daughter experienced “severe abdominal pain.” Her mother took her daughter to the hospital where she was treated for an incomplete abortion. Jennifer Whalen has been charged with a felony count for “medical consultation and judgment,” and with misdemeanors for not being licensed as a pharmacist, endangering the welfare of a child, and simple assault. According to news reports about the case, nearly one-third of Pennsylvania’s abortion clinics have closed since 2012. “The closest clinic to her home was in Harrisburg, about 75 miles away. A state-mandated 24-hour waiting period would mean Whalen and her daughter would have had to make the drive twice, or they would have had to stay overnight in the Harrisburg area.” This criminal case provides an opportunity to challenge the constitutionality and political viability of using criminal laws to punish self or family aided abortions.


**Pending Ballot Measures Related to Reproductive Rights**

**Colorado Ballot Measure**

(Amendment 67) (pending vote on November 4, 2014).

Colorado rejected personhood measures in 2008 and 2010, as voters have in every state thus far presented with one. In November 2014, however, voters will face a personhood ballot measure that asks, “[s]hall there be an amendment to the Colorado [C]onstitution protecting pregnant women and unborn children by defining ‘person’ and ‘child’ in the Colorado criminal code and the Colorado wrongful death act to include unborn human beings?” If passed, the Constitution will be amended in part to read, “In the interest of the protection of pregnant mothers and their unborn children from criminal offenses and neglect and wrongful acts, the words ‘person’ and ‘child’ in the Colorado Criminal Code and the Colorado Wrongful Death Act must include unborn human beings.” As a result of this Amendment every criminal law, including the one defining first degree murder would become applicable to pregnant women who have abortions or experience pregnancy losses. Murder in the first degree occurs when someone deliberately and intentionally causes the death of another “person” (an unborn human being) or knowingly (no intent needed) causes “the death of a child” (and unborn human being) and the person committing the offense is one in a position of trust with respect to the victim.


**North Dakota SCR4009**

(pending vote on November 4, 2014).

In November 2014, North Dakotans will vote on a personhood amendment, SCR4009, which is summarized as “[a] concurrent resolution to create and enact a new section to article I of the Constitution of North Dakota, relating to the inalienable right to
life of every human being at every stage of development.” The law would define life as beginning at conception and would effectively ban abortion in almost all cases, outlaw common forms of birth control, restrict several types of fertility treatments, and potentially could impose legal responsibility for accidents in fertility labs and forbid stem-cell research.


**Tennessee Ballot Measure SJR 127 (Amendment 1) (pending vote on November 4, 2014)**

In November 2014, Tennesseans will vote on SJR 127, or proposed Amendment 1 to the Tennessee Constitution, which reads, “Nothing in this Constitution secures or protects a right to abortion or requires the funding of an abortion. The people retain the right through their elected state representatives and state senators to enact, amend, or repeal statutes regarding abortion, including, but not limited to, circumstances of pregnancy resulting from rape or incest or when necessary to save the life of the mother.” The amendment is proposed to address a 2000 Tennessee State Supreme Court decision that found a constitutionally protected right to abortion within the Tennessee Constitution.


Appendix B

Anti-Abortion Efforts to Stack the State Courts

Coinciding with the enactment of unprecedented numbers of state abortions restrictions and decreasing availability of legal abortion services, opponents of women’s reproductive rights have undertaken a two-pronged strategy to stack the state courts with judges who will be hostile to reproductive rights claims. First, they repeatedly have targeted particular judges in state judicial elections. Second, they have targeted the very processes of judicial selection. Most direct, they have opposed merit-based methods of judicial selection in favor of elections. For example, they have threatened state elected officials that a vote in favor of merit selection will be scored as an anti-abortion vote, which in turn will be used to campaigns to defeat their reelection. Where they cannot defeat merit selection (or as an interim measure), anti-abortion organizations have sought to stack the composition of judicial selection commissions. A spokesperson for Kansans for Life, explained the rationale behind these efforts: “We have a pro-life house and a pro-life senate and a pro-life governor…. We pass pro-life legislation—and we get sued. The next frontier is the courts.”

General Information


Opposition to State Judges

Alaska

In 2012, Alaska Family Action campaigned against Anchorage Superior Court Judge Sen Tan based on two abortion-related decisions: (1) a 2003 decision in which Judge Tan joined the majority to invalidate Alaska's parental consent law; and (2) a 1999 decision striking down Alaska's law barring public funding for abortion except in instances of rape, life endangerment, and incest. Alaska Family Action (formerly Alaska Family Council) has a history of targeting judges based on choice-related rulings. Alaska Family Action campaigned against the retention of Alaska Supreme Court Justice Dana Fabe, who voted with the 3-2 majority in a 2007 decision to strike Alaska's onerous parental consent law.

Information available at:


California

In 1997, then-California Supreme Court Chief Justice Ron George authored a 4-3 opinion invalidating a California law that required minors seeking abortion care to obtain parental consent. Chief Justice George's opinion cited the right to privacy clause in the California Constitution. Justice George and fellow Justice Ming Chin, who joined Justice George in his opinion to strike down the parental consent law, faced retention elections in 1998. Several anti-abortion organizations launched a $2 million campaign to defeat these justices.
Appendix B

Information available at:


Florida

In Florida in 1990, anti-abortion groups waged a campaign against then-Chief Justice Leander Shaw. Florida Right to Life led this targeting of Justice Shaw because of an opinion he authored that invalidated Florida’s parental consent law for minors. This one-issue campaign failed, and Justice Shaw won his retention election by 60% of the vote, but only after having to raise $300,000 to counter the attack on him. The campaign marked one of the only times in Florida history that an organized effort attempted to unseat a well-respected justice. Again, in 2012, the anti-choice group Restore Justice, a group formed to oppose “judicial activists” in the 2012 retention elections, joined the Florida chapter of conservative powerhouse Americans for Prosperity to launch a campaign to unseat Justices R. Fred Lewis, Peggy Quince, and Barbara Pariente. In one of Restore Justice’s television advertisements attacking these justices, they urged Florida voters to “imagine a world where our unborn children are no longer killed.” The American Family Association, a national conservative group, also joined in the effort. David Caton, the association’s executive director for Florida explained, “Individually, many of us will still be pursuing efforts to get Chief Justice Shaw off the court because of what he`s done to parental rights.” The attempt to oust the justices failed, with all three justices retaining their seats by large margins.

Information available at:


Idaho

In Idaho’s May 2000 Supreme Court elections, Justice Cathy Silak was defeated by 60% of the vote after an anti-choice group, Concerned Citizens for Family Values PAC,
ran a full-page newspaper advertisement indicating that she might permit partial-birth abortion to become legal in Idaho.

Information available at:


Iowa

The Family Leader, an anti-abortion and self-described “pro-family” group headed by Bob Vander Plaats, was instrumental in the successful 2010 campaign to remove three Iowa Supreme Court Justices who overturned the state ban on marriage equality. This group, along with the conservative group Iowans for Freedom, also unsuccessfully attempted to unseat Justice David Wiggins for his part in the decision. In addition to their staunch opposition to marriage equality, The Family Leader has been vocal in opposing abortion access for Iowa women. For example, The Family Leader targeted district court Judge Karen Romano for her part in the 2013 district court decision to stay a newly adopted Iowa Board of Medicine rule that prohibited telemedicine abortion. The Family Leader issued a statement saying that telemedicine abortion would continue because “an activist, pro-abortion judge thinks her role is lawmaker.” In linking their 2010 campaign to their opposition to Romano (who faces a retention election in November 2016), The Family Leader warned: “in 2010, Iowans held three activist supreme court judges in check when they voted ‘no’ on their retention. Apparently Judge Romano has not learned a lesson from that vote.” At an anti-retention rally organized by the Family Research Council and National Organization for Marriage, U.S. Rep. Steve King urged votes against judicial retention. Highlighting the connection between anti-marriage equality and anti-choice ideologies, King stated that the ruling to overturn the same-sex marriage ban evidenced the inevitable decimation of other social conservative values such as “defend[ing] life.” The Iowa Family Policy Center, a right-wing state affiliate of Focus on the Family, also urged voters to oppose retention and vote “no” on all judges on the ballot. Iowa for Freedom, another anti-choice group, partnered with national anti-choice groups Family Research Council, National Organization for Marriage, and American Family Association to join in the campaign to remove these three state supreme court justices over the marriage equality ruling, saying that this campaign was an attempt to carry out “God’s will.” In April 2014, The Family Leader hosted four conservative Iowa candidates for U.S. Senate, three of whom promised to “block federal judge nominees who did not adhere to “natural law,” which candidates described as “handed down by God.” Vander Plaats identified the church, the family, and the government as “God’s institutions” and warned that abortion and marriage equality would prevent God from “blessing the country.”

Information available at:


New York

The national anti-abortion group Right to Life distributed a “preferred candidate” list during campaign efforts before the November 2013 legislative and judicial elections for New York’s 9th District.

*Information available at:*


Ohio

In July 2014, anti-abortion group Ohio Right to Life endorsed two anti-abortion candidates, Sharon Kennedy and Judi French, for the Ohio Supreme Court. Kennedy also was backed by anti-choice groups Cincinnati Right to Life and Citizens for Community Values Action PAC in her 2012 campaign.

*Information available at:*


Tennessee

During 2006 retention elections, anti-abortion groups Family Action Counsel of Tennessee, Tennessee Right to Life, American Family Association, Eagle Forum, and
Focus on the Family worked together to defeat sitting justices in part by distributing surveys to judges and information packets about the judges up for retention. Among the survey questions, judges were asked their positions on public funding for abortion care and to align themselves with a list of former presidents based on political ideology. Justice Janice Holder, who was in the majority in a 2000 state supreme court decision holding that the Tennessee Constitution protected the right to choose abortion, was specifically targeted. A similar 2014 campaign by Americans for Prosperity and Republican State Leadership Committee raised more than $1 million in an effort to oust justices that the group deemed too liberal. After fundraising to defend this campaign, Chief Justice Gary Wade, and Justices Cornelia Clark and Sharon Lee all retained their seats. Despite the loss, the opposition was emboldened by the close margin of the retention vote, a sentiment captured by a New York Times headline reading, “Despite Failure, Campaign to Oust Tennessee Justices Keeps Conservatives Hopeful.”

Information available at:


Judicial Questionnaires Generally

For more information about the problematic nature of questionnaires as a means to evaluate judges, see Justice at Stake’s in-depth report on religious liberty and the courts. This report examines this practice by various faith groups, including the anti-choice group Focus on the Family. The report also identifies the tension between the proper role of judges and the perceived goal of elections to create accountability to the voters.

Information available at:

Bert Brandenburg and Amy Kay, Crusading Against the Courts, Justice at Stake (May 2007), http://www.justiceatstake.org/file.cfm/media/resources/CrusadingAgainstCourts_20121F89Bo68B.pdf.
Opposition to Merit Selection

Alaska

In 2014, anti-choice group Alaska Family Action (formerly Alaska Family Council) dedicated efforts to a proposed amendment, SJR 21, which would add three new public members to the Alaska Judicial Council. Traditionally, the Council is composed of three attorneys, three public members who are chosen by the governor and confirmed by the legislature, and the chief justice of the Alaska Supreme Court. This measure, sponsored by several Republican state senators, seeks to pack the Judicial Council with more public members than attorneys. This tactic attempts to chip away at merit selection by giving the governor increased control over the composition of the Council. As one commentator notes, “so long as Republicans remain in power, it makes the process of appointing judges and justices a lot less impartial, and a lot more ideological.” The same local author goes on to comment on the perceived motivations of sponsoring Senator Pete Kelly, saying “[a]t the heart of the matter is not Kelly’s objection to the Judicial Council. It’s an objection to abortion, and to a court that keeps upholding women’s reproductive rights.” In a voter guide published by Alaska Family Action, the group directs voters to support judicial reform, oppose funding for Planned Parenthood, and support Alaska’s ban on marriage equality. Alaska Family Action has a history of opposing judges who do not rule along the group’s ideological lines. In addition, national anti-abortion group Americans United for Life has publicly opposed merit selection in Alaska, and national anti-choice advocate James Bopp also has become involved in Alaska’s judicial selection system, filing a federal suit against the state in an attempt to change the judicial selection process.

Information available at:


Florida

In Florida in 2000, the Christian Coalition partnered with anti-choice groups Family Research Council and Concerned Women for America to successfully defeat a Florida referendum attempting to promote judicial independence by replacing judicial elections in some areas with merit selection. Ideologically conservative and anti-choice groups in Florida have continued to propose measures in an attempt to thwart a transition to merit selection. Among them was a 2001 state constitutional amendment, which would have changed the judicial selection system by requiring Supreme Court retention elections every six years and replacing the current simple majority requirement to a two-thirds approval requirement. In 2012, yet another proposed ballot measure, Amendment 5, would have required Senate confirmation for state supreme court justices and given the state legislature the authority to repeal rules governing the courts by a majority vote. Amendment 5 failed, with 63% of voters voting “no.”

Under Florida’s system of judicial selection, the governor has authority to appoint all members of the judicial nominating commission. Although four of these appointments must come from lists of recommendations submitted by the Florida State Bar, the governor has the power to reject these submitted lists. Despite the leadership of previous Republican governors, this power was never exercised before Governor Rick Scott took office. Scott has rejected nineteen lists of recommended nominees in an attempt to stack the judicial nomination commission.

Information available at:


Kansas

Anti-choice group Kansans for Life opposes merit selection. Currently, pursuant to Kansas’ judicial selection procedures, a nominating commission, composed mostly of attorneys, presents the governor with three recommended judicial nominations. In January 2014, Kansans for Life announced during an anti-abortion rally that it will work to change the judicial selection process, saying that the current system gives too much power to attorneys. Revealing their true motivations, Kansans for Life explained
their opposition to merit selection by saying, “We have a pro-life house and a pro-life senate and a pro-life governor . . . . We pass pro-life legislation—and we get sued. The next frontier is the courts.” Despite a majority of Kansans being opposed to a constitutional amendment that would change the judicial selection process, Republican legislatures, along with state and national anti-abortion groups, continue to attack merit selection through several avenues. In addition to anti-choice groups’ opposition to merit selection, the Kansas Republican Party’s official platform calls for a change from merit selection to direct election. Republican legislators, along with national and state anti-abortion groups, lobbied for a bill introduced in 2010 designed to change the merit selection system to one of gubernatorial appointment. This measure failed by a 17-22 vote in the state Senate after facing concerns that the proposal would disrupt the separation of powers. Kansans for Life also lobbied successfully for a 2013 bill that changed the Kansas Court of Appeals merit selection system to a system of gubernatorial appointment subject to Senate confirmation. With success at the intermediate level, anti-merit advocates are now attempting to change the system at the state supreme court through the requisite constitutional amendment. James Bopp, a leading anti-choice voice, has also led one anti-merit group in filing a federal lawsuit attempting to prevent five attorneys who are members of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission from participating in judicial selection.

Information available at:


Peter Hardin, Group Urges End to Kansas High Court Merit Selection, GAVEL GRAB (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=68145.


Stephen Ware, Kansas Supreme Court Archive, STEPHEN WARE JUDICIAL SELECTION, http://stephenwareukansassupremejudicialselection.blogspot.com/search/label/Kansas%20Supreme%20Court.

Minnesota

For several years, the Minnesota State Legislature has considered a bill that would institute merit selection and retention elections in the state. This measure has drawn
opposition from anti-choice group Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life. The group argued that “the measure denied voters the right to freely choose their own judges.” During a 2013 hearing on the bill before the House Elections Committee, representatives from Minnesota Family Council and Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life (MCCL) testified before the House Elections Committee opposing the retention election portion of merit selection. Sarah Walker, president of Minnesota’s Coalition for Impartial Justice—a group working to achieve merit selection in Minnesota—largely attributes the bill’s defeat to opposition from MCCL. The mounting opposition to merit selection by local and national anti-abortion groups constitutes a troubling tactical strategy. In one news article on the issue, Walker explained that these groups wait until a hearing is scheduled to launch anti-choice opposition to merit selection, promising voting members of the legislature that they will score the vote on merit selection proposals and present a “no” vote as an anti-abortion vote come election season.

Information available at:


New Jersey

New Jersey Governor Chris Christie threatened to change the state supreme court in accordance with conservative ideology. Christie ran for governor on the campaign promise that he would change the composition of the state’s “activist” and “liberal” high court. In 2010, Christie became the first governor to unseat a sitting New Jersey Supreme Court justice when he refused to name then-Justice John Wallace in 2010. Many of Christie’s conservative constituents called for Christie to make good on his campaign promise by removing “liberal” Chief Justice Stuart Rabner. Under political pressure, Christie instead reappointed the Chief Justice to serve until 2030.

Information available at:


Ohio

In 2009, then-Chief Justice Tom Moyer spearheaded an effort to institute merit selection in Ohio. Ohio Right to Life became an early major organization to establish its opposition to merit selection. Supporters of merit selection attempted to place a legislatively referred constitutional amendment on the 2011 statewide ballot calling for the creation of a bipartisan selection panel to recommend judicial nominees to the governor for appointment. Under the proposed system, justices would serve two years before facing a retention election. Ohio Right to Life campaigned against the proposed amendment, which failed to make it onto the 2011 ballot.

Information available at:


Pennsylvania

In 2012, a merit selection proposal in Pennsylvania failed in large part due to opposition by anti-abortion activists, including the Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation. This group donates money in support of judicial candidates it believes will oppose abortion rights, and, therefore, possesses influence in determining who fills judicial seats. The merit selection proposal was killed in the House Judiciary Committee only days after the group warned members that they would consider members’ votes on the issue when making endorsements in the next election. As one Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation representative told house members, “a yes vote [for merit selection] will be considered a pro-abortion vote.” As a consequence of House inaction, the bill is procedurally barred from appearing on the general ballot until 2017 at the earliest.

Information available at:


Tennessee

Previously, Tennessee had a merit-based system of judicial selection wherein a seventeen-member commission would recommend three judicial nominees to the governor. However, in 2013, the Tennessee legislature effectively eliminated the merit selection system by failing to extend the life of the Judicial Nominating Commission. With the Commission’s expiration in 2013, Tennessee’s judicial selection process is in limbo, with no formal process of selection currently in place. Tennessee voters will consider a ballot measure in November 2014 regarding the selection of appellate judges, which would establish a new mechanism for judicial selection wherein the governor would appoint judges subject to legislative review. This measure, Amendment 2, was championed by anti-abortion group Family Action Council of Tennessee, which is simultaneously advocating for the adoption of Amendment 1, an amendment that would remove the state’s constitutional right to abortion. Anti-choice group Tennessee Right to Life is also funding the campaign in support of Amendment 1.

Information available at:


J.R., Amendment 2 is Second for a Reason, FACT BLOG (May 2, 2014), http://factn.org/amendment-2-is-second-for-a-reason/.

